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THE MARK OF A RESOLD GOOD 
Yvette Joy Liebesman* and Benjamin Wilson** 
INTRODUCTION 
The cosmetics giant Mary Kay requires that its Independent Beauty 
Consultants purchase at least $200 worth of product each month.1 Unfortu-
nately for Amy Weber, her relationship with Mary Kay was terminated 
because she failed to purchase the monthly minimum.2 To dispose of her 
large inventory of unsold products, Mrs. Weber sold the products through 
her website, touchofpinkcosmetics.com, and through her “Touch of Pink” 
eBay store.3  
In 2008, Mary Kay brought action against Mrs. Weber in a Texas fed-
eral court under the Lanham Act, alleging that she was an unaffiliated 
online reseller of Mary Kay cosmetics and that her sales therefore constitut-
ed unfair competition, passing off, and trademark infringement.4 In its 
pleadings, Mary Kay claimed that the website and eBay store’s names cre-
ated confusion as to affiliation or sponsorship—that is, consumers would 
wrongly assume that Weber was an authorized Independent Beauty Con-
sultant affiliated with Mary Kay, even if that confusion ended prior to sale. 5 
In her motion for summary judgment, Mrs. Weber argued that the first 
sale and nominative fair use doctrines rendered her sales lawful under the 
Lanham Act.6 The court, however, denied her motion,7 and Mrs. Weber 
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 1 Mary Kay, Inc. v. Weber, 601 F. Supp. 2d 839, 845 (N.D. Tex. 2009). 
 2 Id. 
 3 Id. at 845-46. 
 4 Id. at 846; Original Complaint for Damages and Injunctive Relief and Motion for Leave to 
Conduct Expedited Discovery at 16, Mary Kay, 601 F. Supp. 2d 839 (No. 3:08-CV-0776-G). Mary Kay 
also included state claims of tortious interference. Mary Kay, 601 F. Supp. 2d at 846. 
 5 Mary Kay, Inc. v. Weber, No. 3:08-CV-0776-G, 2009 WL 2569070, at *5 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 14, 
2009); Original Complaint, supra note 4, at 17.  
 6 Mary Kay, 601 F. Supp. 2d at 852, 854. 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2184111
158 GEO. MASON L. REV. [VOL. 20:1 
ultimately lost at trial.8 As a result, Mrs. Weber was enjoined from using the 
name “Touch of Pink” as her store name,9 from “using any portion of Mary 
Kay’s product descriptions to describe the products for sale on the defend-
ant’s website,”10 from “[r]epresenting to consumers that Touch of Pink is a 
‘one stop shop’ for all of a consumer’s Mary Kay needs,”11 and from 
“[r]epresenting to consumers that Touch of Pink carries authentic products 
from former consultants that have never been tested or used.”12 Mrs. Weber 
was thus prohibited from selling genuine products in the secondary mar-
ket—an activity that thousands of individuals do on a regular basis at gar-
age sales, flea markets, and secondhand stores. 
With the Internet revolutionizing secondary market sales, Mrs. We-
ber’s problem looms large.13 This Article focuses on websites that resell 
genuine goods in the secondary market and the trademark infringement 
claims that are affecting their ability to legally market these goods.14 Poli-
  
 7 Id. at 864. The court held that genuine issues of material fact precluded summary judgment. Id. 
at 854, 859.  
 8 Mary Kay, Inc. v. Weber, 661 F. Supp. 2d 632, 638 (N.D. Tex. 2009). 
 9 Id. at 642. The Webers had also operated an eBay store called “marykay1stop,” but had ended 
its use and complied with many of Mary Kay’s other demands prior to the commencement of litigation. 
Mary Kay, 2009 WL 2569070, at *1. Weber was also enjoined from selling expired products even 
though Mary Kay did so—even when labeled as such. Mary Kay, 661 F. Supp. 2d at 643.  
 10 Mary Kay, 661 F. Supp. 2d at 644. 
 11 Id. 
 12 Id. Weber was also enjoined from other actions, including “representing to consumers that 
Touch of Pink provides ‘a place for consultants and consumers to locate hard to find and retired product 
or even new Mary Kay items at a great discount.’” Id. at 646. 
 13 See, e.g., Ashby Jones, On Coach and the Counterfeit Crackdown That Wasn’t, WALL ST. J. L. 
BLOG (Feb. 11, 2011, 10:45 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2011/02/11/on-coach-and-the-counterfeit-
crackdown-that-wasnt. 
 14 Recent scholarship has focused on such areas as:  
(1) trademark infringement as it relates to metatags and search engines, see, e.g., Stacey L. 
Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Trademarks and Consumer Search Costs on the Internet, 41 
HOUS. L. REV. 777, 782 (2004); Jennifer E. Rothman, Initial Interest Confusion: Standing at 
the Crossroads of Trademark Law, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 105, 107 (2005); Rachel R. Fried-
man, Note, No Confusion Here: Proposing a New Paradigm for the Litigation of Keyword 
Advertising Trademark Infringement Cases, 12 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 355, 357 (2010); 
Tyson Smith, Note, Googling a Trademark: A Comparative Look at Keyword Use in Internet 
Advertising, 46 TEX. INT’L L.J. 231, 233 (2010); 
(2) online first sale doctrine with regard to copyright infringement, see, e.g., Benjamin Wil-
son, Comment, Notice, Takedown, and the Good-Faith Standard: How to Protect Internet 
Users from Bad-Faith Removal of Web Content, 29 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 613, 
623 (2010);  
(3) free-riding, see Mark A. Lemley & Mark P. McKenna, Owning Mark(et)s, 109 MICH. L. 
Rev. 137, 140 (2010); and  
(4) trademark bullying, see, e.g., Leah Chan Grinvald, Shaming Trademark Bullies, 2011 
WIS. L. REV 625, 628.  
Other scholars focus on competitors who infringe by misleading traffic away from the mark owner’s 
website to the competitor’s site—where the consumer sees the competitor’s goods, instead of the mark 
owner’s. See, e.g., Eric Goldman, Deregulating Relevancy in Internet Trademark Law, 54 EMORY L.J. 
507, 561 (2005). 
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cies that advance the mark owner’s ability to control all distribution chan-
nels would harm consumers and disincentivize competition; manufacturers 
would have less motivation to innovate and improve their product when 
they control all distribution of goods beyond their first sale.15 
This Article argues for an end to spurious claims of confusion where 
genuine goods are sold outside the manufacturer’s distribution channel, as 
long as the reseller clearly disclaims any affiliation with the manufacturer 
or authorized distributor. This is in accord with the work of other scholars 
who have reached similar conclusions regarding irrelevant confusion,16 the 
weak state of trademark fair use,17 and the inadequacy of trademark defens-
es.18 As with arguments in these areas, this Article contends that mark own-
ers’ attempts to increase the scope of their control over distribution chan-
nels thwart competition while doing little to protect consumers from decep-
tion.19 These suggestions would protect the lawful sale of goods in the sec-
ondary market while allowing manufacturers to prevent counterfeit prod-
ucts from being sold online.  
To begin this discussion, Part I looks at the nature of the Internet re-
sale business, and the issues facing resellers regarding the use of the marks 
that are attached to the goods sold. This section tackles some of the practi-
cal difficulties that confront small resellers attempting to defend themselves 
against the mark owners in court. Part II focuses on the substantive legal 
issues that arise when a manufacturer uses initial interest confusion and a 
reseller’s non-affiliation with “official” distribution channels of the good to 
limit competition. This Part examines how some courts have interpreted the 
law regarding fair use and confusion with regard to the online resale of 
genuine goods in a way that weakens the first sale doctrine in the process, 
  
 15 See generally Lemley & McKenna, supra note 14, at 187. 
 
[Trademark law] is designed to facilitate a competitive marketplace by allowing consumers 
to know what they are buying . . . . But a trademark law that is distorted into a right to own 
markets—one that seeks out and tries to forbid all free riding on a mark—ends up interfering 
with rather than enabling competition.  
 
Id. 
 16 Mark A. Lemley & Mark McKenna, Irrelevant Confusion, 62 STAN. L. REV. 413, 414 (2010); 
see also Lemley & McKenna, supra note 14, at 170 (“[I]t is not enough that consumers misunderstand 
the relationship between the plaintiff’s and the defendant’s goods. If that misunderstanding has no 
consequence for consumers—if they are not hurt as a result—it is not something trademark law should 
care about.”). 
 17 William McGeveran, Rethinking Trademark Fair Use, 94 IOWA L. REV. 49, 110 (2008). 
 18 Michael Grynberg, Things Are Worse Than We Think: Trademark Defenses in a “Formalist” 
Age, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 897, 902 (2009). 
 19 Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Trademark Monopolies, 48 EMORY L.J. 367, 486-87 (1999); see also 
Grynberg, supra note 18, at 965 (“Without material confusion the trademark plaintiff’s claim of an 
injury in fact looks dubious.”). 
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as well as the overlap of trademark and copyright infringement claims in 
the online resale market.  
Part III elaborates on trademark law’s fair use and first sale defenses, 
and some courts’ reluctance to recognize these defenses in the case of re-
sold goods. Part IV proposes that courts strengthen trademark’s nominative 
fair use and first sale doctrines, while discounting the controversial doctrine 
of initial interest confusion, to protect legitimate online merchants while 
recognizing the need for manufacturers to stop online counterfeiters. We 
conclude that the first sale doctrine, which is well-established in patent and 
copyright law, and considered by both the courts and Congress as an im-
portant limitation to a mark owner’s Lanham Act rights in the brick-and-
mortar setting, should include a presumption of non-infringement when a 
reseller is using a mark to truthfully inform consumers about the source of a 
genuine good. 
I. THAT’S GONNA LEAVE A MARK 
When one buys a Waterford crystal vase, the Waterford mark remains 
associated with the vase. No matter how many times that vase is sold, trad-
ed, gifted, regifted, or bequeathed, it remains identified as a Waterford vase. 
This serves a trademark’s dual function of identifying the source of the vase 
and protecting the Waterford brand equity.20 “[T]rademark law protects the 
producer from pirates and counterfeiters” and others who would attempt to 
exploit the good will established by Waterford.21 However, merely because 
the Waterford mark remains inextricably linked to its vases as a source in-
dicator does not and should not protect Waterford from controlling down-
stream sales of their goods outside their own distribution chains.22 And 
while the Lanham Act is intended to promote quality goods and services by 
protecting producers’ good will, it is irrelevant whether the customer even 
knows the identity of the source.23 Consumers need not be able to identify 
the company behind a mark—for example, the fact that Kimberly-Clark 
makes “Huggies” disposable diapers is unimportant, so long as the consum-
  
 20 See S. REP. NO. 100-515, at 4 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5577, 5580 (stating that 
trademark protection serves a dual purpose: it “protects the public by making consumers confident that 
they can identify brands they prefer and can purchase those brands without being confused or misled”). 
In addition, the report states that the second function of trademark law is to protect the brand equity of 
mark owners, who spend “conside[r]able time and money bringing a product to the marketplace.” Id. 
 21 Id.  
 22 Sebastian Int’l, Inc. v. Longs Drug Stores Corp., 53 F.3d 1073, 1074 (9th Cir. 1995) (per curi-
am) (“[T]he right of a producer to control distribution of its trademarked product does not extend be-
yond the first sale of the product.”). 
 23 Mastercrafters Clock & Radio Co. v. Vacheron & Constantin-Le Coultre Watches, Inc., 221 
F.2d 464, 466 (2d Cir. 1955); S. REP. NO. 100-515, at 4, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N at 5580; 1 J. 
THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 3:7 (4th ed. 2012). 
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er recognizes that the “Huggies” mark identifies a single source of the 
good.24 
A. From Garage Sales and Consignment Shops to the Internet 
Over the past ten years, casual resellers have migrated from garage 
sales, swap meets, and classified ads to eBay and Craigslist, turning side 
hobbies into lucrative businesses. Today, there are hundreds of books about 
selling goods online;25 every month 30 million new ads are posted on 
Craigslist,26 and every day six million new listings are posted on eBay.27 
The explosive online market has affected the sales of new goods, troubling 
manufacturers;28 in turn, mark owners seek to curtail the growth of this sec-
ondary market through several avenues—some legitimate, and others not so 
much.29 For example, to combat diversion to resellers outside of its official 
distribution chain, Tiffany, Inc., the well-known jeweler, attempted to insti-
tute a policy of limiting retail sales of identical items to lots of five or few-
er, though this proved to be unsuccessful due to its sporadic enforcement.30  
Manufacturers have also used other means to stifle the resale market, 
such as filing claims of trademark and copyright infringement against both 
resellers and auction sites,31 attempting wholesale removal of their goods on 
  
 24 See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 23, § 3:7. 
 25 A search on Amazon.com for “selling on ebay” produced 1,629 results. Search for “selling on 
ebay”, AMAZON.COM, http://www.amazon.com/s/ref=nb_sb_ss_c_1_15?url=search-alias%3Dstrip
books&field-keywords=selling+on+ebay&x=0&y=0&sprefix=selling+on+ebay (last visited Sept. 9, 
2012). 
 26 reComparison Contributor, eBay vs. Craigslist, RECOMPARISON, http://recomparison.com/
comparisons/100646/ebay-vs-craigslist (last visited Sept. 9, 2012). 
 27 Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 463, 475 (S.D.N.Y. 2008), aff’d in part, 600 
F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2010). 
 28 Ellie Mercado, Note, As Long As “It” Is Not Counterfeit: Holding eBay Liable for Secondary 
Trademark Infringement in the Wake of LVMH and Tiffany Inc., 28 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 115, 
116 (2010). 
 29 See Tiffany, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 473 (stating that “rights holders . . . have obvious economic 
incentives to curtail the sale of . . . authentic goods on the Internet—after all, every sale . . . on eBay 
potentially represents a lost sales opportunity via [the manufacturer’s] own authorized distribution 
channels”); Grinvald, supra note 14, at 628. 
 30 See Tiffany, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 473. The policy did not apply to corporations and international 
trade accounts which could buy large quantities of identical items, opening an avenue for someone to 
legitimately receive several identical items. Id. at 483. 
 31 See Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 96, 98 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 647 
(2010) (noting that “[r]educing or eliminating the sale of all second-hand Tiffany goods, including 
genuine Tiffany pieces, through eBay’s website would benefit Tiffany in at least one sense: [i]t would 
diminish the competition in the market for genuine Tiffany merchandise”); Adobe Sys. Inc. v. Korn-
rumpf, 780 F. Supp. 2d 988, 990-91 (N.D. Cal. 2011); Mary Kay, Inc. v. Weber, 601 F. Supp. 2d 839, 
846 (N.D. Tex. 2009). 
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auction websites and other unauthorized distribution channels,32 and using 
auction site take-down notice procedures that are supposed to be reserved 
for removing counterfeit and infringing goods.33 These actions go beyond 
trademark bullying and are more than merely stopping a merchant from 
using the owner’s mark—the goal is to remove the reseller’s goods from the 
market altogether.34  
Courts have aided manufacturers by ignoring the lack of confusion as 
to a good’s source and finding that online initial interest confusion as to 
sponsorship or affiliation of the distribution channel—even when the goods 
are the genuine goods of the mark owner—constitutes infringement.35 Mary 
Kay, Inc. v. Weber,36 for example, illustrated this phenomenon.37 These 
courts’ reasoning is contradicted by strong evidence showing that many 
consumers visit sites like eBay and Craigslist for the purpose of finding 
genuine goods at lower costs than they would find buying directly from the 
mark owner or authorized retailer, and are therefore not confused as to affil-
iation regarding distribution channel.38 This is just one of many reasons, 
unrelated to trying to find the mark owner, for a consumer to use the mark 
in question as an Internet search term.39 
B. Genuine Goods 
As long as the customer is not confused as to the source of these genu-
ine goods, then the identity of the purveyor of the goods—whether it be the 
mark owner’s own distribution channel or a reseller40—should be irrelevant. 
As source identifiers, marks “provide[] consumers with information they 
  
 32 See generally Mary Kay, 601 F. Supp. 2d at 846; Tiffany, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 481. 
 33 See Tiffany, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 478. 
 34 See Goldman, supra note 14, at 574; Grinvald, supra note 14, at 651. 
 35 Goldman, supra note 14, at 585. Under a claim of initial interest confusion, a mark owner is 
arguing that there is trademark infringement because, even though the consumers’ confusion is “dis-
pelled before an actual sale occurs,” the end result is that the defendant “impermissibly capitalizes on 
the [good will] associated with a mark . . . .” Playboy Enters. v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 354 F.3d 
1020, 1025 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 36 601 F. Supp. 2d 839 (N.D. Tex. 2009). 
 37 Id. at 852; see supra notes 1-12 and accompanying text. 
 38 See Goldman, supra note 14, at 577. Professor Eric Goldman discusses how customer surveys 
and other data show a variety of reasons for the use of trademark search terms, including finding distri-
bution sources other than those authorized by the mark owner, and that there no evidence of confusion 
based on use of search terms. See id. at 522, 565. 
 39 Cf. id. at 521 (“[O]ne cannot make any legally-supportable inferences about [Internet consum-
ers’] search[] objectives based on the keywords used.”). 
 40 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 23, § 3:7. Assuming there is no deception or fraud whereby the 
consumer is led to believe that the reseller is affiliated with the mark owner. See Rothman, supra note 
14, at 187 (noting that “misrepresent[ing] a website . . . should be used as evidence of likely confu-
sion”).  
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need (and cannot otherwise readily obtain) in order to match their desires to 
particular products.”41 Indeed, the legislative history of the Lanham Act and 
related case law recognizes the need to protect consumers from passing off 
or otherwise confusing customers into purchasing goods that are not the 
genuine goods of the mark owner.42 Trademarks serve to (1) foster competi-
tion in the marketplace;43 (2) encourage manufacturers to maintain the qual-
ity of goods;44 (3) “discourage[] those who hope to sell inferior products by 
capitalizing on a consumer’s inability quickly to evaluate the quality of an 
item offered for sale”;45 (4) help consumers locate products and services 
more efficiently;46 and (5) serve as a “species of advertising.”47 And while 
trademark protection may have some anticompetitive consequences, “such 
protection may nevertheless remain justified so long as the mark improves 
the flow of otherwise indiscernible information concerning . . . the product 
to consumers, and . . . consumer desires to producers.”48 
C. The Harsh Realities of Pursuing Justice 
Although it would appear that—based on nominative fair use and first 
sale/exhaustion principles—online secondary-sale merchants have a strong 
and valid affirmative defense against any claims of trademark infringement 
and should thus be free from interference by the mark owners, the reality of 
fighting these charges in court, or even battling take-down notices from 
  
 41 Lunney, supra note 19, at 369; see also 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 23, § 3:12 (“A trademark is 
not merely a symbol of good will but is often the most efficient agent for the very creation of good will 
and consumer acceptance.”). 
 42 Park ’N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park and Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 198 (1985); S. REP. NO. 79-1333, at 
3 (1946); H. Peter Nesvold & Lisa M. Pollard, Essay, Foreword: Half a Century of Federal Trademark 
Protection: The Lanham Act Turns Fifty, 7 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 49, 49 (1996). 
 43 S.REP. NO. 79-1333, at 4 (“To protect trade-marks, therefore, is to protect the public from 
deceit, to foster fair competition, and to secure to the business community the advantages of reputation 
and good will by preventing their diversion from those who have created them to those who have not.”). 
See generally Nesvold & Pollard, supra note 42, at 50. 
 44 Park ’N Fly, 469 U.S. at 198 (“[T]rademarks foster competition and the maintenance of quality 
by securing to the producer the benefits of good reputation.”); 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 23, § 2:4; 
ROGER E. SCHECHTER & JOHN R. THOMAS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: THE LAW OF COPYRIGHTS, 
PATENTS AND TRADEMARKS § 25.3, at 547 (2003). 
 45 SCHECHTER & THOMAS, supra note 44, § 25.3, at 547 (quoting Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prod-
ucts Co., 514 U.S. 159, 164 (1995)). 
 46 See, e.g., Qualitex Co., 514 U.S. at 163-64; see also SCHECHTER & THOMAS, supra note 44, § 
25.3, at 547; William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective, 30 
J.L. & ECON. 265, 275 (1987). 
 47 Northam Warren Corp. v. Universal Cosmetic Co., 18 F.2d 774, 774 (7th Cir. 1927); 1 
MCCARTHY, supra note 23, § 3:12. 
 48 Lunney, supra note 19, at 431. “Where a trademark serves as a source of otherwise indiscerni-
ble information concerning a product, protecting the trademark enables consumers to connect their 
desires to a specific good on the store shelf.” Id. at 431-32. 
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Internet service providers (“ISPs”) and online auction sites, may be enough 
to shut down a secondary market business.49 The ISPs and auction sites also 
may face accusations of contributory infringement should they refuse to 
remove listings for the allegedly offending goods.50  
The roadblocks faced by small resellers who choose to defend them-
selves against the mark owners in court find the odds stacked against them 
even in getting to the courthouse steps. Even those who want to either pro-
actively fight mark owners through declaratory judgment actions or defend 
themselves against infringement may not have the resources to do so. 
Oftentimes, the small reseller is unable to afford an attorney to defend 
itself,51 or if on the offensive, the stakes are too small for it to be economi-
cally feasible for an attorney to pursue a claim on behalf of the client.52 One 
illustration of the hardships fighting these claims involves reseller Karen 
Dudnikov, who, along with her husband, Michael Meadors, owns an eBay 
online auction store called Tabber’s Temptations.53 Shortly after Ms. Dud-
nikov began listing goods for sale on eBay, she started having to defend 
  
 49 See Grinvald, supra note 14, at 653; Ina Steiner, David Versus Goliath: eBay Sellers Take on 
Corporate America, ECOMMERCEBYTES (Aug. 5, 2003), http://www.ecommercebytes.com/
cab/abn/y03/m08/i05/s02. 
 50 See infra Part II.D. 
 51 Grinvald, supra note 14, at 647-48.  
 
A trademark owner’s threat that it will sue the small business or individual if they do not 
comply with its demands is often enough economic pressure to force the small business or 
individual into compliance. Additionally, bullying occurs (when coupled with an unreasona-
ble interpretation of rights) when trademark owners include a demand for attorney’s fees in 
their cease-and-desist letters—even if the recipient complies—or claims that attorney’s fees 
and costs will be awarded when the litigation against the small business or individual is 
found in favor of the large corporation (and the letter is often couched in terms that lead the 
recipient to conclude that the only outcome is that the large corporation will win). The small 
business or individual has no way of knowing that attorney’s fees are awarded only in rare 
instances of trademark infringement.  
 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
 52 Melvin Simensky & Eric C. Osterberg, The Insurance and Management of Intellectual Property 
Risks, 17 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 321, 337 (1999). 
 
One of the consequences of the soaring cost of litigation is that many businesses simply can-
not afford the expense of bringing an infringement suit, even if attorneys’ fees may be recov-
ered in the end. This problem is exacerbated by the fact that many significant technological 
innovations are developed by smaller businesses lacking the financial resources to sue larger 
companies which are likely to defend vigorously. Furthermore, many intellectual property 
lawyers are unwilling to litigate such cases on a contingency fee basis. 
 
Id. (footnote omitted); see also Karen Dudnikov & Michael Meadors, Tabberone’s Trademark & Copy-
right Abusers’ Hall of Shame, TABBER’S TEMPTATIONS, http://www.tabberone.com/Trademarks/
trademarks.shtml (last visited Sept. 9, 2012). 
 53 Dudnikov v. Chalk & Vermilion Fine Arts, Inc., 514 F.3d 1063, 1068 (10th Cir. 2008); Steiner, 
supra note 49. Karen Dudnikov had given up her life as an accountant to run this business selling home-
made and used goods online. Id. 
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herself against take-down notices submitted by the mark owners associated 
with the goods she was selling.54 At various times, Ms. Dudnikov’s auctions 
were shut down due to recurring take-down notices, even though each time 
she successfully defended the claim and had the item relisted.55 But in 2003, 
Major League Baseball (“MLB”) had eBay delist items containing various 
baseball team logos,56 and was able to have some of Ms. Dudnikov’s auc-
tions shut down for several days.57 
The attorneys with whom they spoke advised the couple either they 
had no case, or that it wasn’t worth pursuing,58 so Dudnikov and Meadors 
chose to bring a declaratory judgment action against MLB pro se, based on 
the trademark nominative fair use and copyright first sale doctrines.59 Even-
tually, MLB agreed to settle the matter and have its complaints against 
Dudnikov’s eBay account expunged.60 The couple spent an enormous 
  
 54 Steiner, supra note 49; Dudnikov & Meadors, supra note 52; see also Colorado Seamstress 
Sues Major League Baseball Over Right to Use Their Licensed Fabrics, BASEBALL INFORMATION 
CENTER, http://infoonbaseball.com/articles/issue19.php (last visited Sept. 9, 2012) [hereinafter Seam-
stress Sues]. 
 55 See Dudnikov & Meadors, supra note 52. 
 56 Karen Dudnikov & Michael Meadors, Tabberone Strikes Back Again!, TABBER’S 
TEMPTATIONS, http://www.tabberone.com/Trademarks/HallOfShame/MLB/MLB.shtml (last visited 
Sept. 9, 2012); Steiner, supra note 49; see also Letter from William G. Pecau, Steptoe & Johnson LLP, 
to Karen Dudnikov & Michael Meadors (Aug. 21, 2003), available at http://www.tabberone.com/
Trademarks/HallOfShame/MLB/ourlawsuit/Settlement.shtml. 
 57 Steiner, supra note 49. This was the fifth, billion-dollar company that had interfered with their 
eBay auctions and accused them of trademark or copyright infringement. Id. The couple had also fought 
back against Disney, who had previously contacted eBay to remove auction items, claiming that Dudni-
kov and Meadors were not selling licensed Disney products that Dudnikov had made out of copyrighted 
Disney fabric that had been legally purchased, and turned into aprons, tissue box holders, and comfort-
ers. Id. The case was settled, with Disney agreeing to stop their attempts to close down Dudnikov’s and 
Meadors’ online sale of products made with Disney fabric because the products made were not copy-
rightable works. See Letter from Mary Fossier on behalf of Disney Enters., Inc., to Karen Dudnikov & 
Michael Meadors (Feb. 3, 2003), available at http://www.tabberone.com/Trademarks/
DisneyLawsuit/Agreement.shtml. Trademark infringement is not grounds for a takedown under Section 
512 of the Copyright Act. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) (2006) (discussing copyright infringement but making 
no mention of trademark infringement). 
 58 See, e.g., Dudnikov & Meadors, supra note 52 (“We did consult lawyers and we were told we 
did not have a chance. So we ignored the lawyers and represented ourselves.”). 
 59 Dudnikov & Meadors, supra note 56; see Davidoff & Cie, S.A. v. PLD Int’l Corp., 263 F.3d 
1297, 1301 (11th Cir. 2001) (“Under what has sometimes been called the ‘first sale’ or ‘exhaustion’ 
doctrine, the trademark protections of the Lanham Act are exhausted after the trademark owner’s first 
authorized sale of that product.”); see also 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 23, § 25:41. But see Au-Tomotive 
Gold Inc. v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 603 F.3d 1133, 1138-39 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that the first 
sale doctrine did not apply to a manufacturer who attached lawfully purchased VW logos to marquee 
license plate frames due to post-purchase confusion). The Ninth Circuit distinguished Au-Tomotive 
Gold’s use of the VW logo from other forms of resale in that “customers buy marquee license plates 
principally to demonstrate to the general public an association with Volkswagen.” Id. at 1138. 
 60 See Letter from William G. Pecau, Steptoe & Johnson LLP, to Karen Dudnikov & Michael 
Meadors, supra note 56. 
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amount of time researching the law, and lost sales every time their auctions 
were shut down.61 In addition, the cease-and-desist letters continued from 
other mark owners.62 
Karen Dudnikov chose to fight and publicized their struggle online 
against these large corporations.63 Her inability to hire an attorney to repre-
sent them in her declaratory judgment action exemplifies one of several 
roadblocks facing resellers when they seek to defend their livelihoods.64 
And many small businesses would most likely choose to close shop rather 
than spend the energy and money required to defend themselves against the 
behemoths.65 Due to the high costs of prolonged litigation, resellers who 
most likely would have a valid nominative fair use claim may not be able 
defend themselves.66 As noted by Professor William McGeveran, several 
ways in which courts that do follow New Kids on the Block v. News Ameri-
ca Publishing, Inc.67 apply nominative fair use in a way to make it “less 
effective in delivering clear and swift resolutions that reduce chilling effects 
on speech.”68  
Reseller-defendants may face the same fate as Veoh Networks, which, 
even though it was cleared of copyright infringement liability, was fatally 
wounded defending itself.69 “Veoh is legal, but Veoh is dead—killed by 
rightsowner lawfare that bled it dry. Meanwhile, rightsowners wrongly as-
sessed the legality of Veoh, but the worst consequence they suffered was 
overpaying their lawyers.”70 Likewise, resellers may be dead right, but dead 
nonetheless if they attempt to fight big plaintiffs who are more concerned 
with shutting down competition than proving infringement. 
II. WAGING LAWFARE 
In addition to using threatening cease-and-desist letters, mark owners 
have not been shy about pursuing their claims in court.71 The most common 
  
 61 Steiner, supra note 49. At one point, Ms. Dudnikov had to again find accounting work. Id. 
 62 Ms. Dudnikov’s and Mr. Meadors’ auctions continued to be shut down by, and they received 
threatening letters from Precious Moments, Wiggles, MGA Entertainment, and many others. See Dudni-
kov & Meadors, supra note 52. 
 63 See id. 
 64 See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text. 
 65 See Grinvald, supra note 14, at 663. 
 66 McGeveran, supra note 17, at 62-63. 
 67 971 F.2d 302 (9th Cir. 1992). 
 68 McGeveran, supra note 17, at 90.  
 69 See Eric Goldman, UMG v. Shelter Capital: A Cautionary Tale of Rightsowner Overzealous-
ness, TECH. & MKTG. LAW BLOG (Dec. 27, 2011), http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2011/12/
umg_v_shelter_c.htm. 
 70 Id. 
 71 See McGeveran, supra note 17, at 63-64. 
2012] THE MARK OF A RESOLD GOOD 167 
suits brought against online resellers are claims of either infringement,72 or 
false designation of origin or description73 regarding the reseller’s affiliation 
with the mark owner as an “authorized” distributor, often based on initial 
interest confusion.74 Other claims are sometimes also alleged, including 
trademark dilution,75 tortious interference with business relations,76 copy-
right infringement,77 and false advertising.78  
A. Claiming All Sorts of Confusion 
When asserting a claim of confusion as to affiliation, in her prima fa-
cie case, a plaintiff mark owner must demonstrate that (1) she is the owner 
of a registered mark; (2) the defendant has used a mark in commerce in 
connection with goods or services as an indicator of source or sponsorship; 
  
 72 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) provides relief for registered marks: 
 
Any person who shall, without the consent of the registrant —  
.  .  .  use in commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation of a 
registered mark in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising 
of any goods or services on or in connection with which such use is likely to cause con-
fusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive . . . 
shall be liable in a civil action by the registrant[. ]  
 
15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) (2006); see also SCHECHTER & THOMAS, supra note 44, at 636 n.4.  
 73 Under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1), 
 
Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services. . . uses in commerce any 
word, term, name, symbol, or device. . . or any false designation of origin, false or mislead-
ing description of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact, which— 
. . . is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation, connec-
tion, or association of such person with another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or ap-
proval of his or her goods, services, or commercial activities by another person . . .  
shall be liable in a civil action by any person who believes that he or she is or is likely to be 
damaged by such act. 
 
Id. § 1125(a). 
 74 See, e.g., Mary Kay, Inc. v. Weber, 601 F. Supp 2d 839, 846 (N.D. Tex. 2009). For more in-
formation about confusion regarding the reseller’s affiliation with authorized distributors, see 
Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Church, 411 F.2d 350, 352 (9th Cir. 1969). 
 75 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (“Subject to the principles of equity, the owner of a famous mark that is 
distinctive . . . shall be entitled to an injunction against another person who, at any time after owner’s 
mark has become famous, commences use of a mark or trade name in commerce that is likely to cause 
dilution by blurring or dilution by tarnishment of the a famous mark, regardless of the presence or 
absence of actual or likely confusion, of competition, or of actual economic injury.”). 
 76 See, e.g., Coastal Abstract Serv., Inc. v. First Am. Title Ins. Co., 173 F.3d 725, 733 (9th Cir. 
1999). 
 77 See infra note 253 and accompanying text. 
 78 See Sally Beauty Co. v. Beautyco, Inc., 304 F.3d 964, 970 (10th Cir. 2002). 
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and (3) this use is likely to cause customer confusion.79 Of these elements, 
the last is the key in any infringement suit.80 Supposedly, “likelihood” is not 
the mere possibility of confusion; customer confusion must be “probable,”81 
and the likelihood of confusion must affect an “appreciable or substantial 
number of consumers.”82 Each circuit uses a similar set of factors to make 
this determination.83 The factors adopted by the Second Circuit in Polaroid 
Corp. v. Polarad Electronics Corp.84 are typical of those used by other cir-
cuits.85  
Resellers are usually accused of confusion as to affiliation or sponsor-
ship86—that is, the consumer is likely to think that the reseller is an author-
ized distributor or affiliated with the mark owner, even if, upon visiting the 
  
 79 See, e.g., Dep’t of Parks & Recreation v. Bazaar del Mundo, Inc., 448 F.3d 1118, 1124 (9th Cir. 
2006). 
 80 Bird v. Parsons, 289 F.3d 865, 877 (6th Cir. 2002) (“Generally speaking, the key question in 
cases where a plaintiff alleges trademark infringement and unfair competition is whether the defendant’s 
actions create a likelihood of confusion as to the origin of the parties’ goods or services.”). 
 81 Rodeo Collection, Ltd. v. West Seventh, 812 F.2d 1215, 1217 (9th Cir. 1987); SCHECHTER & 
THOMAS, supra note 44, § 29.1, at 638. 
 82 Mushroom Makers, Inc. v. R.G. Barry Corp., 580 F.2d 44, 47 (2d Cir. 1978) (per curiam); 
SCHECHTER & THOMAS, supra note 44, § 29.1, at 639. 
 83 See SCHECHTER & THOMAS, supra note 44, § 29.1, at 640. 
 84 287 F.2d 492 (2d Cir. 1961). 
 85 Id. at 495; SCHECHTER & THOMAS, supra note 44, § 29.1, at 640. 
  Polaroid is a world-renowned manufacturer of photographic equipment, sheet-polarizing mate-
rial, optical desk lamps, and other electronics products. Polaroid, 287 F.2d at 494. Polaroid sued Polarad 
Electronics (manufacturer of microwave devices and television-studio equipment) for trademark in-
fringement due to the similarity of its name and the proximity of the goods the two corporations manu-
factured. Id. at 493-95. In ruling in favor of Polaroid, the Second Circuit listed eight factors to be used to 
determine whether there is a likelihood of confusion: (1) the strength of the plaintiff’s mark; (2) the 
degree of similarity between the plaintiff’s and the defendant’s marks; (3) the proximity of the products 
or services covered by the marks; (4) the likelihood that the plaintiff will bridge the gap; (5) evidence of 
actual confusion of consumers; (6) the defendant’s good faith in adopting the mark; (7) the quality of the 
defendant’s product or service; and (8) consumer sophistication. Id. at 495. 
  Other circuits have adopted their own, similar versions of the Polaroid factors. For example, the 
Tenth Circuit uses a six-factor test first delineated in Sally Beauty Co. v. Beautyco, Inc., 304 F.3d 964, 
972 (10th Cir. 2002), declaring that, for determining likelihood of confusion, courts in that circuit exam-
ine  
 
(1) the degree of similarity between the marks; (2) the intent of the alleged infringer in adopt-
ing the mark; (3) evidence of actual confusion; (4) similarity of products and manner of mar-
keting; (5) the degree of care likely to be exercised by purchasers; and (6) the strength or 
weakness of the marks. 
 
Id.; see also Austl. Gold, Inc. v. Hatfield, 436 F.3d 1228, 1240 (10th Cir. 2006) (noting that “[n]o one 
factor is dispositive, and likelihood of confusion is a question of fact”). 
 86 See, e.g., Designer Skin, LLC. v. S & L Vitamins, Inc., 560 F. Supp. 2d 811, 818 (D. Ariz. 
2008) (where the mark owner argued “that the visible uses of its marks on the websites in close associa-
tion with [the defendant’s] own logo” was a form of initial interest confusion). This claim failed on 
summary judgment. Id. at 827. 
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reseller’s website, the consumer immediately realizes this is not the case.87 
As noted by Professors Mark Lemley and Mark McKenna, “‘sponsorship’ 
or ‘affiliation’ could refer to virtually any relationship between the parties,” 
even ones that do not create any material confusion on the part of the con-
sumer.88 These terms are not defined in the Lanham Act, “so courts must 
interpret those terms and their interaction with the confusion require-
ment.”89 
In their assertions, mark owners often compare this initial interest con-
fusion to a “bait and switch”—the plaintiff claims that the defendant has 
used the plaintiff’s mark in a way that gains the consumers’ initial atten-
  
 87 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (“Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services 
. . . uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof . . . which 
. . . is likely to . . . deceive as to the affiliation, connection, . . . or as to the origin, sponsorship, or ap-
proval of his or her goods, services . . . shall be liable in a civil action by any person who believes that 
he or she is or is likely to be damaged by such act.”). This is considered forward confusion, which 
occurs when the mark owner is arguing that “the alleged trademark infringer [is taking] advantage of the 
reputation and good will of a senior trademark owner by adopting a similar or identical mark.” Harlem 
Wizards Entm’t Basketball, Inc. v. NBA Props., Inc. 952 F. Supp. 1084, 1091 (D.N.J. 1997). The two 
other major forms of confusion—reverse and post-sale confusion—are less prevalent in claims by mark 
owners against internet resellers. In reverse confusion, “a larger, more powerful entity adopts the trade-
mark of a smaller, less powerful trademark user and thereby causes confusion as to the origin of the 
senior trademark user’s goods or services.” Id. “Post-sale confusion occurs when use of a trademark 
leads individuals (other than the purchaser) mistakenly to believe that a product was manufactured by 
the trademark-holder.” Gibson Guitar Corp. v. Paul Reed Smith Guitars, LP, 423 F.3d 539, 549 (6th Cir. 
2005). It can occur, in some courts’ views, when a manufacturer offers a consumer a cheap knockoff of 
a more expensive Louis Vuitton bag; the buyer acquires the prestige of owning what appears to be the 
more expensive product. See Malletier v. Dooney & Bourke, Inc. 561 F. Supp. 2d 368, 384 
n.112 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). And while the purchaser knows it is a knock-off of a Louis Vuitton bag, others 
seeing the purchaser with the bag are not aware of this, and instead associate the cheap knock-off with 
the mark owner’s product. Id. at 384. In addition to the mark owner being associated with inferior 
goods,  
 
[t]he creation of confusion in the post-sale context can be harmful in that if there are too 
many knockoffs in the market, sales of the originals may decline because the public is fearful 
that what they are purchasing may not be an original. Furthermore, the public may be de-
ceived in the resale market if it requires expertise to distinguish between an original and a 
knockoff. Finally, the purchaser of an original is harmed by the widespread existence of 
knockoffs because the high value of originals, which derives in part from their scarcity, is 
lessened. 
 
Hermes Int’l v. Lederer de Paris Fifth Ave., Inc., 219 F.3d 104, 108 (2d Cir. 2000). For further discus-
sion on post-sale confusion and the first sale doctrine with regard to resold goods, see David W. Barnes, 
Free-Riders and Trademark Law’s First Sale Rule, 27 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 
457, 485-90 (2011). 
 88 See Lemley & McKenna, supra note 16, at 427. 
 89 Grynberg, supra note 18, at 964; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2006). 
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tion.90 Initial interest confusion relies on the notion that, due to being initial-
ly drawn to the competitor,  
 
[e]ven though the consumer eventually may realize that the product is not the one originally 
sought, he or she may stay with the competitor. In that way, the competitor has captured the 
trademark holder’s potential visitors or customers. 
     Even if the consumer eventually becomes aware of the source’s actual identity, or where 
no actual sale results, there is nonetheless damage to the trademark. This damage can mani-
fest itself in three ways: (1) the original diversion of the prospective customer’s interest to a 
source that he or she erroneously believes is authorized; (2) the potential consequent effect of 
that diversion on the customer’s ultimate decision whether to purchase caused by an errone-
ous impression that two sources of a product may be associated; and (3) the initial credibility 
that the would-be buyer may accord to the infringer’s products—customer consideration that 
otherwise may be unwarranted and that may be built on the strength of the protected mark, 
reputation and [good will].91  
 
Initial interest confusion is a controversial claim and has not been ac-
cepted by all circuits. On the one hand, the Ninth Circuit recognizes “that 
the use of another’s trademark in a manner calculated ‘to capture initial 
consumer attention, even though no actual sale is finally completed as a 
result of the confusion, may be still an infringement.’”92 The Fourth Circuit, 
however, describes it as “relatively new and sporadically applied” and has 
refused to consider the doctrine as a legitimate claim under the Lanham 
Act.93 
  
 90 See Vail Assocs., Inc. v. Vend-Tel-Co., 516 F.3d 853, 872 (10th Cir. 2008) (“Initial interest 
confusion is a ‘bait and switch’ tactic that permits a competitor to lure consumers away from a service 
provider by passing off services as those of the provider, notwithstanding that the confusion is dispelled 
by the time of sale.”). For a synopsis of the case history of initial interest confusion, see Rothman, supra 
note 14, at 114-21. In spite of Rothman’s fervent attack on the doctrine, initial interest confusion has 
unfortunately yet to meet its demise. Id. at 121-30. 
 91 Austl. Gold, Inc. v. Hatfield, 436 F.3d 1228, 1238-39 (10th Cir. 2006) (citations omitted); see 
also Lamparello v. Falwell, 420 F.3d 309, 315-16 (4th Cir. 2005) (“‘[T]he Lanham Act forbids a com-
petitor from luring potential customers away from a producer by initially passing off its goods as those 
of the producer’s, even if confusion as to the source of the goods is dispelled by the time any sales are 
consummated.’”) (quoting Dorr-Oliver, Inc. v. Fluid-Quip, Inc., 94 F.3d 376, 382 (7th Cir. 1996)); 
Deborah F. Buckman, Initial Interest Confusion Doctrine Under Lanham Trademark Act, 183 A.L.R. 
FED. 553, 578-82 (2003). 
 92 Brookfield Commc’ns, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm’t Corp. 174 F.3d 1036, 1062 (9th Cir. 1999). 
 93 Lamparello, 420 F.3d at 315-16. The First Circuit also rejects initial interest confusion. See N. 
Light Tech., Inc. v. N. Lights Club, 97 F. Supp. 2d 96, 113 (D. Mass. 2000) (noting that “initial confu-
sion . . . is not cognizable under trademark law in the First Circuit.”) (citing Astra Pharm. Products, Inc. 
v. Beckman Instruments, Inc., 718 F.2d 1201, 1207 (1st Cir. 1983)), aff’d, 236 F.3d 57 (1st Cir. 2001); 
see also Goldman, supra note 14, at 565-66 (“[Initial interest confusion] is predicated on multiple mis-
taken and empirically unsupported assumptions about searcher behavior. . . . [It is based on the unsup-
ported assumption] that a searcher using a trademarked keyword is looking for the trademark owner (or, 
perhaps, some authorized licensee or secondary user.” (footnote omitted)). Professor Goldman discusses 
in detail the various reasons—other than trying to find the mark owner—for a consumer to be using the 
mark in question as a search term. Id. at 521-28. 
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The initial interest confusion doctrine “is at odds with the purpose, in-
tent, and literal meaning of the Lanham Act”94 and we should question the 
outright validity of the doctrine.95 As Professor Jennifer Rothman argues, 
[a]pplication of the initial interest confusion doctrine prevents comparative advertisements, 
limits information available to consumers, and shuts down speech critical of trademark hold-
ers and their products and services. The initial interest confusion doctrine undermines the 
free market system under a misguided notion that competition in and of itself is unfair.96 
B. Acts of Aggression 
Encouraged by the expansion of trademark protection in the courts, 
mark owners have become increasingly aggressive in policing their marks.97 
Since “the middle part of the twentieth century, courts [have] expanded the 
range of actionable confusion beyond confusion over the actual source of a 
product—trademark law’s traditional concern—to include claims against 
uses that might confuse consumers about whether the trademark owner 
sponsors or is affiliated with the defendant[.]”98 Courts are finding liability 
even when consumers “couldn’t possibly have been confused about the 
actual source of the defendants’ products.”99 
The actionable confusion, according to these courts, was not confusion that would have led 
consumers to buy the wrong product, or even to wrongly think they were buying from the 
trademark owner. Rather, the theory in [the examples described by Professors Lemley and 
McKenna] was that consumers would think there was some relationship between the trade-
mark owner and the defendant based on the defendant’s use of the trademark. The problem 
with this formulation is that it fails to specify the types of relationships about which confu-
sion is relevant or the harm that supposedly flows from confusion about those relation-
ships.100 
  
 94 Lisa M. Sharrock, Realigning the Initial Interest Confusion Doctrine with the Lanham Act, 25 
WHITTIER L. REV. 53, 54 (2003); see also Rothman, supra note 14, at 108 (“The creation and applica-
tion of initial interest confusion doctrine directly contravenes the Lanham Act, the goals underlying 
trademark protection, other intellectual property laws, and the First Amendment.”). 
 95 Rothman, supra note 14, at 111 (arguing that “the doctrine is wrong as a matter of policy and . . 
. it represents an assault on the fundamental principles of trademark law”). 
 96 Id. at 108. 
 97 See generally Lemley & McKenna, supra note 16, at 416-21 (evincing that the recipients of 
cease-and-desist letters from mark owners—who claim consumers would wrongly assume that the mark 
owner had granted permission or otherwise sponsored the mark’s use by the defendant—usually cease 
using the mark, even when such use was most likely legitimate). “The recipients of all these threats . . . 
knew well that they had to take the asserted claims seriously because courts have sometimes been per-
suaded to shut down very similar uses.” Id. at 418. 
 98 Id. at 414. 
 99 Id. at 421. 
 100 Id. at 421-22. 
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Resellers are often at the mercy of spurious trademark and copyright 
infringement claims, and some courts have ignored affirmative defenses in 
finding infringement.101 As discussed supra, and as illustrated in the Mary 
Kay decision, some courts have accepted that confusion with regard to dis-
tribution of genuine goods is a valid form of trademark infringement, ignor-
ing that there is no confusion as to the source of the goods—thus eviscerat-
ing the first sale affirmative defense.102 These forms of confusion, however, 
were not envisioned to apply to a competitor’s use of the mark to sell the 
mark owner’s own goods.103 Rather, it “results when a consumer seeks a 
particular trademark holder’s product and instead is lured to the product of 
a competitor by the competitor’s use of the same or a similar mark.”104 
Thus, in spite of the genuineness of the article sold through resellers, 
these online resale businesses face the prospect of infringement suits, due to 
courts’ broadening interpretation of what constitutes actionable confu-
sion.105 By rejecting a first sale defense based on initial interest confusion—
which lowers the bar for a finding of a likelihood of confusion and thus 
infringement liability—“courts have made it very difficult to resell goods 
online.”106 In essence, the ability to successfully claim initial interest confu-
sion based on the distribution channel eviscerates the first sale/exhaustion 
defense for Internet resellers, even when any confusion ends before the sale 
is consummated.107 For Amy Weber, this meant that her claim that she was 
  
 101 Grinvald, supra note 14, at 660-61. 
 102 See supra notes 4-12, 86-91, and accompanying text. 
 103 Mary Kay, Inc. v. Weber, No. 3:08–CV–0776–G, 2009 WL 2569070, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 14, 
2009). 
 104 Austl. Gold, Inc. v. Hatfield, 436 F.3d 1228, 1238 (10th Cir. 2006). 
 105 Lunney, supra note 19, at 371, 385. Since 1958, “the law’s traditional willingness to permit a 
considerable degree of confusion in order to leave room for competitive imitation vanished, and courts 
began to seize on the slightest evidence of confusion as proof of infringement.” Id. at 385. 
 106 Rothman, supra note 14, at 140-45. 
 107 See Buckman, supra note 91, at 607-08. 
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selling genuine Mary Kay goods fell on deaf ears.108 Such decisions seem 
contradictory to both congressional intent and Supreme Court precedent.109  
C. Mixing It Up 
Mark owners have also sought to indirectly stifle resellers by accusing 
the resellers’ web hosts of infringement through claims of contributory in-
fringement.110 ISPs and online auction sites would find it very useful if there 
were an Internet safe harbor provision in the Lanham Act similar to the one 
that currently exists for copyright owners.111 Under Section 512 of the Cop-
yright Act, if a rights holder notifies a service provider such as eBay that 
infringing copyrighted material is stored in its system, in order to be im-
mune from a suit for monetary damages, the service provider must prompt-
ly remove the allegedly infringing work.112 The limitations of copyright 
  
 108 Mary Kay, 2009 WL 2569070, at *1, *8. While most courts have not addressed Internet resale 
directly with regard to initial interest confusion, other courts have, with mixed results. Compare Austl. 
Gold, Inc. v. Hatfield, 436 F.3d 1228, 1238-40 (10th Cir. 2006) (recognizing claim of initial interest 
confusion and noting that resellers’ disclaimers cannot prevent damage from initial interest confusion) 
and PACCAR Inc. v. TeleScan Techs., L.L.C., 319 F.3d 243, 256 (6th Cir. 2003) (“A disclaimer disa-
vowing affiliation with the trademark owner read by a consumer after reaching the web site comes too 
late. This ‘initial interest confusion’ is recognized as an infringement under the Lanham Act.”), over-
ruled on other grounds by KP Permanent Make-up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111, 
121-23 (2004), with Standard Process, Inc. v. Banks, 554 F. Supp. 2d 866, 871 (E.D. Wis. 2008) (find-
ing no initial interest confusion where trademark holder’s unaltered products were available through 
reseller’s website) and S&L Vitamins, Inc. v. Austl. Gold, Inc., 521 F.Supp.2d 188, 201 (E.D.N.Y. 
2007) (finding initial interest confusion cannot be established before determination of whether the 
reseller used the trademarks in a trademark sense). 
 109 See infra notes 219-232 and accompanying text.  
 110 Cf. John T. Cross, Contributory Infringement and Related Theories of Secondary Liability for 
Trademark Infringement, 80 IOWA L. REV. 101, 101-02 (1994); Elizabeth K. Levin, A Safe Harbor for 
Trademark: Reevaluating Secondary Trademark Liability After Tiffany v. eBay, 24 BERKELEY TECH. 
L.J. 491, 506 (2009).  
 111 Levin, supra note 110, at 518-21. 
 112 17 U.S.C. § 512 states: 
 
A service provider shall not be liable for monetary relief . . . for infringement of copyright by 
reason of the storage at the direction of a user of material that resides on a system or network 
controlled or operated by or for the service provider, if the service provider—  
   (A)(i) does not have actual knowledge that the material or an activity using the material 
on the system or network is infringing;  
(ii) in the absence of such actual knowledge, is not aware of facts or circumstance 
from which infringing activity is apparent; or  
   (iii) upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness, acts expeditiously to remove, or 
disable access to, the material; 
   (B) does not receive a financial benefit directly attributable to the infringing activity, in a 
case in which the service provider has the right and ability to control such activity; and 
   (C) upon notification of claimed infringement . . . responds expeditiously to remove, or 
disable access to, the material that is claimed to be infringing or to be the subject of infring-
ing activity.  
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rights, however, should, in theory, thwart attempts to remove listings of 
genuine items for resale.113 However, this copyright misuse leaves the mark 
owners vulnerable to lawsuits under Section 512(f) of the Digital Millenni-
um Copyright Act (“DMCA”).114 
The Copyright Act of 1976 provides copyright owners the exclusive 
right to reproduce, make adaptations, distribute, publicly display, and pub-
licly perform their works.115 Since photographing a three-dimensional copy-
righted work results in a reproduction and adaptation of that work, photo-
graphing a Waterford vase, even for the purpose of posting the photograph 
in an advertisement selling the lamp, would theoretically infringe on the 
copyright owner’s reproduction and adaptation right, and avail the copy-
right owner of the Section 512 take-down provisions.116 
There are, however several limitations on these exclusive rights,117 in-
cluding one which protects such activities. Congress created a narrow ex-
ception to the exclusive reproduction and adaptation rights in copyrighted 
  
17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1) (2006). The written notification required under § 512(c)(1)(C) must include 
(among other requirements): 
 
(ii) [i]dentification of the copyrighted work claimed to have been infringed . . .  
(iii) [i]dentification of the material that is claimed to be infringing . . . that is to be re-
moved . . . and information reasonably sufficient to permit the service provider to locate 
the material. 
* * * 
(v) [a] statement that the complaining party has a good faith belief that use of the ma-
terial in the manner complained of is not authorized by the copyright owner, its agent, or 
the law[, and] 
(vi) [a] statement that the information in the notification is accurate, and under penalty 
of perjury, that the complaining party is authorized to act on behalf of the owner of an ex-
clusive right that is allegedly infringed. 
 
Id. § 512(c)(3). 
 113 See id. § 512(f). 
 114 Id. 
 
Misrepresentations.—Any person who knowingly materially misrepresents under this sec-
tion— 
(1) that material or activity is infringing, or  
(2) that material or activity was removed or disabled by mistake or misidentification, 
shall be liable for any damages, including costs and attorneys’ fees, incurred by the alleged 
infringer . . . who is injured by such misrepresentation, as the result of the service provider 
relying upon such misrepresentation in removing or disabling access to the material or activi-
ty claimed to be infringing, or in replacing the removed material or ceasing to disable access 
to it. 
 
Id. 
 115 Id. § 106. 
 116 See id. §§ 106(1)-(2). 
 117 The Copyright Act grants the owner of the copyright the exclusive rights of reproduction, 
adaptation, distribution, public performance, public display, and digital broadcasts of sound recordings. 
See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006). However, there are several exceptions to these exclusive rights, such as fair 
use (§ 107), first sale (§ 109) and compulsory licenses (§ 115). 
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works that have been lawfully reproduced in “useful article[s],” such as a 
lamp, or an article of clothing.118 Section 113(c) of the Act declares that it is 
not an infringement of the reproduction right119 for others to make and dis-
tribute pictures or photos of a useful article, such as our hypothetical Tiffa-
ny lamp, in connection with ads or commentaries related to the distribution 
or display of such articles, so long as the lamp has been offered for sale or 
distributed to the public.120 Consequently, it is lawful for a furniture store to 
feature a picture in a news ad or catalog of the lamp whose base is a statue, 
even though that would involve making a two-dimensional photographic 
reproduction of the statue. And, despite MLB’s protestations, it was lawful 
as a matter of copyright law for Karen Dudnikov to display a photograph of 
MLB-logo items on her listing web page.121 Since the photographs may be 
used to advertise goods for sale, this use should not expose the reseller to 
trademark infringement liability; otherwise Section 113 of the Copyright 
Act is meaningless.122  
Yet mark owners persist in bullying resellers to remove photographs 
of their items from websites based on a trademark likelihood of confusion 
claim, eviscerating the exception delineated in Section 113.123 For example, 
Standard Process separately sued two resellers of dietary supplements—
Total Health Discount124 and chiropractor Scott J. Banks125—for trademark 
infringement, based in part on their use of photographs of Standard Pro-
cess’s products that were being resold online by the defendants.126  
Standard Process sent cease-and-desist letters to the two defendants, 
stating that use of Standard Process’s photographs violated trademark 
law,127 and the defendants complied by removing the product photo-
  
 118 Id. § 113. 
 119 Id. § 106(1). 
 120 Id. § 113(c) (“In the case of a work lawfully reproduced in useful articles that have been offered 
for sale or other distribution to the public, copyright does not include any right to prevent the making, 
distribution, or display of pictures or photographs of such articles in connection with advertisements or 
commentaries related to the distribution or display of such articles, or in connection with news re-
ports.”). 
 121 See id. Of course this presupposes that the manufacture of the utilitarian article is a lawful 
reproduction of the work. If the maker of the lamps never secured permission to use the statues as lamp 
bases, then the Section 113(c) exception does not apply. Id. 
 122 See id. 
 123 See Rebecca Tushnet, Supplemental Complaint: Internet Resale Case Survives Summary Judg-
ment, REBECCA TUSHNET’S 43(B)LOG (June 12, 2008), http://tushnet.blogspot.com/2008/06/
supplemental-complaint-internet-resale.html; see also Standard Process, Inc. v. Total Health Disc., Inc., 
559 F. Supp. 2d 932, 936 (E.D. Wis. 2008); Standard Process, Inc. v. Banks, 554 F. Supp. 2d 866, 868 
(E.D. Wis. 2008).  
 124 Total Health, 559 F. Supp. 2d at 935-36. 
 125 Banks, 554 F. Supp. 2d at 868. 
 126 Total Health, 559 F. Supp. 2d at 936; Banks, 554 F. Supp. 2d at 868.  
 127 Total Health, 559 F. Supp. 2d at 936; Banks, 554 F. Supp. 2d at 868. 
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graphs.128 Yet in addition to Section 113, the trademark first sale doctrine 
includes the ability to “stock, display, and resell”; posting photographs of 
products online amounts to displaying the products.129 There was no reason 
the defendants should have removed the photographs. Their removal, ac-
cording to Professor Rebecca Tushnet, is “caving to bullying” and unwar-
ranted.130  
Since the first sale doctrine was originally borrowed from copyright 
law,131 courts should consider that, since copyright law does not limit the 
right to use photographs of copyrighted material to advertise the sale of 
useful articles,132 the same use should be not be grounds for a trademark 
infringement claim. The evident purpose is to allow further sales in com-
merce,133 and the same limitation should be recognized with regard to 
trademark infringement claims. Moreover, product photographs can actual-
ly help mark owners identify counterfeit products.134 So, ironically, by cre-
ating an environment in which product photographs cause liability, mark 
owners make it even more difficult—for themselves and consumers—to 
identify counterfeit products.135 
Of course, a major motive for removing photographs from the re-
seller’s auction listings is that this will hurt sales. “[D]etailed information 
and photographs . . . help entice buyers.”136 eBay even lists as one of its 
  
 128 Total Health, 559 F. Supp. 2d at 936; Banks, 554 F. Supp. 2d at 868. Banks even agreed to a 
permanent injunction prohibiting him from putting photographs of Standard Process’ products on his 
website or in his email solicitations. Banks, 554 F. Supp. 2d at 870. 
 129 See Sebastian Int’l, Inc. v. Longs Drug Stores Corp., 53 F.3d 1073, 1076 (9th Cir. 1995) (per 
curiam) (emphasis added) (“It is the essence of the ‘first sale’ doctrine that a purchaser who does no 
more than stock, display, and resell a producer’s product under the producer’s trademark violates no 
right conferred upon the producer by the Lanham Act.”); see also Austl. Gold, Inc. v. Hatfield, 436 F.3d 
1228, 1241 (10th Cir. 2006). 
 130 Tushnet, supra note 123. In Standard Process, Inc. v. Banks, the court found that Banks’ web-
site did not impermissibly give the impression he was an authorized dealer because, in addition to post-
ing disclaimers, he “does not include any pictures . . . .” 554 F. Supp. 2d at 869. It is unfortunate that the 
cases discussed imply that photographs connote sponsorship or affiliation, even though under the 
Trademark first sale doctrine, removing photographs is unwarranted. 
 131 S&L Vitamins, Inc. v. Austl. Gold, Inc., 521 F. Supp. 2d 188, 202 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (citing 
Luxottica Grp. S.p.A. v. Bausch & Lomb Inc., 160 F. Supp. 2d 545, 552 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)). 
 132 17 U.S.C. § 113(c) (2006); see also Rebecca Tushnet, Australian Gold-Digging: Reseller of 
Genuine Goods Receives Mixed Ruling, REBECCA TUSHNET’S 43(B)LOG (Oct. 11, 2007), 
http://tushnet.blogspot.com/2007/10/australian-gold-digging-reseller-of.html. 
 133 S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 1 (1998); Levin, supra note 110, at 514. 
 134 Michelle C. Leu, Comment, Authenticate This: Revamping Secondary Trademark Liability 
Standards to Address A Worldwide Web of Counterfeits, 26 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 591, 616-17 (2011); 
Four Easy Tips to Spot Counterfeit MAC Products: eBay Guides, EBAY, http://reviews.ebay.com/Four-
easy-tips-to-spot-Counterfeit-MAC-Products?ugid=10000000004884212 (last visited Sept. 9, 2012) 
[hereinafter Four Easy Tips]. 
 135 See Leu, supra note 134, at 616-17; Four Easy Tips, supra note 134. 
 136 Phil Hall, Let’s Make an E-Deal, HARTFORD COURANT, May 18, 2008, at D1 (quoting a man 
who sold a tanning bed on eBay). 
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most effective strategies the use of “photos from a variety of angles.”137 If 
mark owners were able to claim that a reseller’s use of photographs consti-
tutes trademark infringement, this would be an end run around Section 113 
of the Copyright Act and eviscerate any protection it affords.138 
We can see an illustration of this misclaiming of rights in Disney’s ac-
tions against Karen Dudnikov. In 2002, Disney sought to remove items 
from Ms. Dudnikov’s website that were crafted from legally purchased bulk 
fabric139 that contained licensed Disney characters.140 Eventually Disney 
  
 137 Top 10 Tips, EBAY, http://pages.ebay.com/sellerinformation/howtosell/top10.html (last visited 
Sept. 9, 2012). 
 138 See 17 U.S.C. § 113(c) (2006). 
 139 Complaint & Plaintiffs’ Motion for Declaratory Judgment ¶¶ 3-6, Tabbers Temptations v. 
Disney Enters., No. 02-WM-2402 (PAC), (D. Colo. Dec. 24, 2002), available at http://www.
tabberone.com/Trademarks/DisneyLawsuit/ourlawsuit/complaint.html. 
 
   15. Based upon information and belief, the defendant aggressively protects the copyright-
ed images. These actions include policing of flea markets, craft shows, craft malls, and Inter-
net auctions sites. At crafts shows and flea markets, when hand-crafted items are found that 
use the fabrics portraying the copyrighted images owned by the defendant, cease and desist 
letters are distributed. On the auction sites, the auctions featuring similar fabric items are 
terminated at the request of the defendant.  
   16. Based upon information and belief, Disney counsel knows, or reasonably should 
know, the fabric items are not derivatives as defined by federal courts, federal law and rec-
ognized authorities on copyrights. The intimidation tactics used by Disney are therefore ille-
gal and immoral. They rely on the fact people can’t fight back because of the potential enor-
mous legal expense. 
   17. Based upon information and belief, on September 4, 2002, the defendant requested 
eBay® terminate three auction listing [sic] by Tabberone, falsely alleging to eBay® in an af-
fidavit that the articles offered on these auctions were infringing items. 
   18. When asked, a representative of the defendant, a Deborah Perry, responded that the 
auctions were terminated because the fabric items were considered to be derivatives and 
therefore infringing upon the copyrights held by the defendant. 
 
Id. ¶¶ 15-18. 
 140 Disney licenses the sale of bulk fabric containing Disney characters, which is then sold through 
authorized distributors such as Amazon.com and Joann Fabrics. Search Results for “Disney Licensed 
Fabric” in Arts, Crafts, and Sewing, AMAZON.COM, http://www.amazon.com/gp/search/ref=
sr_nr_i_0?rh=k%3Adisney+licensed+fabric%2Ci%3Aarts-crafts&keywords=disney+licensed+fabric&
ie=UTF8&qid=1315085872 (last visited Sept. 9, 2012); Search Results for “Disney Fabric”, 
JOANN.COM, http://www.joann.com/search/_disney_fabric (last visited Sept. 9, 2012). Some sites selling 
Disney licensed fabric even advertise the projects that can be made with the fabric. See, e.g., Disney 
Fabrics: Little Mermaid, Cars, Toy Story and Other Favorite Disney Characters, DISNEY FABRICS, 
http://www.disneyfabrics.com (last visited Sept. 9, 2012). That Disney licenses the production of these 
fabrics can easily be seen as an implied license by Disney for purchasers to cut and use the fabric to 
make various items of clothing, quilts, and knick-knacks. For further reading on implied licenses, see 
Michael Grynberg, Property Is a Two-Way Street: Personal Copyright Use and Implied Authorization, 
79 FORDHAM L. REV. 435, 454-58 (2010). In his article, Professor Grynberg argues that “courts should 
appreciate the reasonable expectations of consumers in their control of personal property used to interact 
with the protected works.” Id. at 435-36. Karen Dudnikov used legally purchased Disney licensed fabric 
in her creations: 
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backed down and agreed that Ms. Dudnikov’s creations from licensed Dis-
ney fabric were not infringing uses.141 Disney claimed copyright infringe-
ment to shut down her eBay auction, yet Disney’s objection to Ms. Dudni-
kov displaying her crafts on her website was in direct conflict with the ex-
emption under Section 113.142 Thus, despite a demonstrably false copyright 
infringement claim, manufacturers such as Disney attempt to use the take-
down provisions in Section 512 of the Copyright Act to remove online auc-
tion items listings.143  
Misusing copyright and trademark law points to a single objective: to 
decrease the competition of secondary markets.144 Small dealers are faced 
with either defending themselves or ceasing operations.145 And as previous-
ly discussed, even when a successful defense is likely, the costs of such 
litigation can be prohibitively expensive, and even the threat of litigation 
leads the secondary market merchants to abandon their online ventures.146 
  
   22. The defendant, directly and through licensees, has released innumerable different cop-
yrighted fabrics in the last few years through an estimated ten thousand national fabric out-
lets including Wal-Mart, Hancock Fabrics, and Joann Fabrics. It was the intention of the de-
fendant that the fabric be cut, shaped, and sewn into fabric items such as pillows, bedding, 
wearing apparel, accessories, etc. There is no other purpose for selling uncut fabric. 
   23. The Plaintiffs lawfully purchased the copyrighted fabric from retail outlet sources. 
Since the plaintiffs use of the copyrighted fabric was consistent with the intended purpose of 
the sale of the fabric, the subsequent sales of the fabric items falls wholly under the First Sale 
Doctrine. 
 
Complaint & Plaintiffs’ Motion for Declaratory Judgment, supra note 139, ¶¶ 22-23. 
 141 Letter from Mary Fossier on behalf of Disney Enters., Inc. to Karen Dudnikov & Michael 
Meadors, supra note 57 (“You [TabberOne] represent that you have already stopped and agree that in 
the future you will no longer make or use copies of [Disney Enterprises, Inc.] copyrighted and/or trade-
mark characters (or other intellectual properties) in connection with your business except it is under-
stood that you make and sell hand-crafted items from licensed fabric bearing [Disney] properties and 
will use photographs, including close-up shots of the licensed fabric used to make the item, as reasona-
bly necessary to show the item for sale in a particular auction and to describe the item as being made 
from licensed Disney fabric.”). 
 142 Complaint & Plaintiffs’ Motion for Declaratory Judgment, supra note 139, ¶ 6; see 17 U.S.C. § 
113(c). Disney’s actions could lead to lawsuits similar to Stephanie Lenz’ against Universal Music 
Corporation, where she claimed that her fair use of Prince’s song “Let’s go Crazy”—played briefly in 
the background of a video of her baby dancing—should have been considered by Universal’s attorneys 
before filing their take-down notice with YouTube. See Wilson, supra note 14, at 616. 
 143 Complaint & Plaintiffs’ Motion for Declaratory Judgment, supra note 139, ¶ 6; see also Stand-
ard Process, Inc. v. Total Health Disc., Inc., 559 F. Supp. 2d 932, 936-37 (E.D. Wis. 2008); Standard 
Process, Inc. v. Banks, 554 F. Supp. 2d 866, 868 (E.D. Wis. 2008); Tushnet, supra note 123. 
 144 See Grinvald, supra note 14, at 650-51. 
 145 See id. at 647. 
 146 See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text. 
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D. Further Pursuits 
In addition to attacking resellers, in their aggressive pursuit to shut 
down the Internet resale market, mark owners have also taken their fight to 
ISPs and online auction sites, alleging contributory infringement based on 
resellers’ use of these sites to advertise the mark owners’ goods.147 The Su-
preme Court has held that 
[e]ven if a manufacturer does not directly control others in the chain of distribution, it can be 
held responsible for their infringing activities under certain circumstances. . . . [I]f a manu-
facturer or distributor intentionally induces another to infringe a trademark, or if it continues 
to supply its product to one whom it knows or has reason to know is engaging in trademark 
infringement, the manufacturer or distributor is contributorially responsible for any harm 
done as a result of the deceit.
 148 
In their suits, mark owners allege that auction sites are not doing 
enough to stop counterfeiters; however, the mark owners also have the ob-
jective of removing genuine goods from this alternative distribution chan-
nel.149 For example, in 2002, Tiffany & Co., the well-known jewelry com-
pany, began pressuring eBay to summarily remove Tiffany goods that met 
some general criteria—such as merchants selling more than five items—
alleging that any Tiffany items sold in bulk outside Tiffany’s normal distri-
bution chain had to be counterfeit.150 When eBay refused to do so, Tiffany 
sued, contending that eBay was “facilitating and advertising the sale of 
‘Tiffany’ goods that turned out to be counterfeit.” 151  
eBay was successful in defending both direct and indirect infringement 
claims based on the defenses of nominative fair use152 and lack of control 
over the merchants who use the site.153 The Second Circuit declined to find 
eBay contributorily liable, stating “that eBay’s practice was promptly to 
remove the challenged listing from its website, warn sellers and buyers, 
  
 147 See, e.g., Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 101 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 647 
(2010). 
 148 Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc. 456 U.S. 844, 853-54 (1982). 
 149 See, e.g., Tiffany, 600 F.3d at 98. 
 150 This allegation was rejected by both the district court and on appeal. Id. at 109 n.13. 
 151 Id. at 101. Tiffany claimed these actions “constituted direct and contributory trademark in-
fringement, trademark dilution, and false advertising.” Id. 
 152 Id. at 103 (agreeing “with the district court that eBay’s use of Tiffany's mark on its website and 
in sponsored links was lawful. eBay used the mark to describe accurately the genuine Tiffany goods 
offered for sale on its website. And none of eBay’s uses of the mark suggested that Tiffany affiliated 
itself with eBay or endorsed the sale of its products through eBay’s website.”). 
 153 Id. at 106, 109 (holding that eBay was not contributorially liable because it had not continued 
“to supply its [service] to one whom it knows or has reason to know is engaging in trademark infringe-
ment” (quoting Inwood Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. at 854)). 
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cancel fees it earned from that listing, and direct buyers not to consummate 
the sale of the disputed item.”154  
While the court found that eBay did possess general knowledge that 
counterfeit items were listed on its website, it held that under the Supreme 
Court test outlined in Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, 
Inc.,155 generalized knowledge was not sufficient “to impose upon eBay an 
affirmative duty to remedy the problem.”156 Other websites have also suc-
cessfully defended themselves against similar suits.157  
In spite of winning in court, these websites want to avoid suits for con-
tributory infringement, and will take an unnecessarily strong conservative 
approach regarding accused listings.158 The hosts want to ensure that they 
are viewed merely as “conduits” between the buyer and seller with no direct 
control over the listed goods,159 and will usually remove listings based on 
any accusation by the mark owner.160 If it is later proved (by the entity list-
ing the good for sale) that it is indeed a genuine good and there is no confu-
sion as to “distribution channel” affiliation, the item is relisted.161 This cycle 
  
 154 Id. at 106. 
 155 456 U.S. 844, 853-54 (1982). 
 156 Tiffany, 600 F.3d at 107 (quoting Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 463, 508 
(S.D.N.Y. 2008), aff’d in part, 600 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2010)). “The [district] court reasoned that Inwood’s 
language explicitly imposes contributory liability on a defendant who ‘continues to supply its product 
[—in eBay's case, its service—] to one whom it knows or has reason to know is engaging in trademark 
infringement.’” Id. (quoting Tiffany, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 508). 
 157 See, e.g., GMA Accessories, Inc. v. BOP, LLC, 765 F. Supp. 2d 457, 465 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) 
(holding that the plaintiff’s “allegation of constructive knowledge . . . based upon the federal registration 
[did] not establish that Electric Wonderland knew or had reason to know of the [Plaintiff’s] trademark”); 
Sellify Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 09 Civ. 10268(JSR), 2010 WL 4455830, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 4, 
2010) (finding that there was “no evidence that Amazon had particularized knowledge of, or direct 
control over” infringing material and promptly acted when it received a demand letter from the plain-
tiff); see also 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. Lens.com, Inc., 755 F. Supp. 2d 1151, 1184 (D. Utah 2010). 
“‘For contributory trademark infringement liability to lie’ with a service provider, however, it ‘must 
have more than a general knowledge or reason to know that its service is being used to [infringe]. Some 
contemporary knowledge of which particular [acts] are infringing or will infringe in the future is neces-
sary.’” Id. (quoting Tiffany, 600 F.3d at 107). Importantly, “the doctrine of contributory trademark 
infringement should not be used to require defendants to refuse to provide a product or service to those 
who merely might infringe the trademark.” 1-800 Contacts, 755 F. Supp. 2d at 1184 (quoting Tiffany, 
576 F. Supp. 2d at 509-10). 
 158 See, e.g., Tiffany, 600 F.3d at 98-99. 
 159 See Sellify, 2010 WL 4455830, at *4 (“[A] service provider may be liable for contributory 
infringement only when it has ‘[d]irect control . . . of the instrumentality used by a third party to in-
fringe’ on the plaintiff’s trademark.” (second alteration in original) (quoting Tiffany, 600 F.3d at 104-
05)). 
 160 See Tiffany, 600 F.3d at 103; cf. Hendrickson v. eBay, Inc., 165 F. Supp. 2d 1082, 1093 n.14 
(C.D. Cal. 2001) (describing eBay’s process of searching for and removing infringing listings). 
 161 Cf. Tiffany, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 474, 517 (noting that “Tiffany has occasionally been wrong [in 
alleging that an item listed on eBay was counterfeit] and later requested that listings be reinstated”). The 
Second Circuit noted that, since a substantial number of authentic Tiffany goods are sold on eBay, 
“[r]educing or eliminating the sale of all second-hand Tiffany goods, including genuine Tiffany pieces, 
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of removing/disputing/relisting, however, costs the resellers of genuine 
goods time, money, and frustration162 and creates added burdens to both the 
reseller and the auction site, stifling the sale of goods for both parties.163 
Under the eBay model, every time an item is listed, the auction site earns a 
fee, and another fee is earned when the item is sold.164 Yet when a “take 
down” occurs, the listing fee is returned to the seller, depriving the host of 
the fee for a legitimate good.165 If the reseller eventually gives up due to the 
burden of constantly having to defend legitimate auction listings to the host, 
then both the reseller and the host lose the income that is generated from the 
listing and sale of the good.166 
A clearly defined and strong trademark first sale doctrine, however, 
would give auction hosting sites less concern over potential lawsuits by 
mark owners who don’t like their items being sold outside their authorized 
distribution channels.167 
  
through eBay’s website would benefit Tiffany in at least one sense: It would diminish the competition in 
the market for genuine Tiffany merchandise.” Tiffany, 600 F.3d at 98. 
 162 See, e.g., Tiffany, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 517 n.39. The district court noted that, 
 
[i]n addition, it is certainly possible that other listings have been erroneously reported. Tiffa-
ny refuses to authenticate items without proof that the items were purchased from a Tiffany 
store. Several sellers have complained to Tiffany that their items were inappropriately re-
ported, only to have Tiffany refuse to offer any meaningful way of validating their legitima-
cy.  
 
Id. 
 163 An additional burden on the seller is recreating the listing. See Why Did eBay Remove My 
Listing?, EBAY, http://pages.ebay.com/help/sell/questions/listing-ended.html (last visited Sept. 9, 2012) 
(“If we agree that your item was removed in error, you can relist it. Unfortunately, you’ll have to recre-
ate the listing from scratch.”). 
 164 Fees for Selling on eBay, EBAY, http://pages.ebay.com/help/sell/fees.html (last visited Sept. 9, 
2012) (“The basic cost of selling an item is the insertion fee plus the final value fee. . . . When you list 
an item on eBay, you’re charged an insertion fee. If the item sells, you’re also charged a final value 
fee.”). 
 165 Why Did eBay Remove My Listing?, supra note 163 (“If we removed your listing because of a 
policy violation, we may or may not refund your fees for that listing, depending on the policy you vio-
lated and whether you’ve violated our policies in the past. If we refund your fees, all fees related to the 
removed listing will be automatically credited to your account within one billing cycle.”). 
 166 Cf. Tiffany, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 516 (“In addition to removing the [allegedly offending] listing, 
eBay also warned sellers and buyers, cancelled all fees associated with the listing, and directed buyers 
not to consummate the sale of the listed item.”). 
 167 “[T]rademark law needs a theory of trademark injury that distinguishes harm to legitimate 
interests the law should protect from a mere desire to capture a benefit enjoyed by another.” Lemley & 
McKenna, supra note 14, at 137. 
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III. GETTING DEFENSIVE 
It has been repeatedly acknowledged that the producer of a good can-
not prevent others from using the good’s mark to truthfully describe the 
good.168 This basic belief is the foundation for both nominative fair use and 
first sale defenses, and “reflects the simple insight that anybody should be 
free to refer to goods and services by their brand names.”169 
A. Repackaged, Repaired, Resold 
There are several ways to use another’s mark in commerce which do 
not constitute infringement. These include, among others,170 (1) the vendor 
is selling repackaged goods; (2) the vendor is selling used or repaired 
goods; (3) or the vendor is reselling a genuine good.171  
While using a mark to identify repackaged goods may be done in a 
non-infringing way, the repackager does not receive absolute protection 
under the first sale doctrine—the repackaging “can present a non-trivial 
harm to the producer’s good will, and can deceive consumers who, in addi-
tion to identifying the trademark, have come to expect or rely upon a par-
ticular type of packaging in their purchasing decisions.”172 
When a “reseller’s repackaging interferes with the trademark owner’s 
ability to control the quality of its products . . . two harms can arise: harm to 
the consuming public in the form of deception and harm to the trademark 
owner in the form of loss of [good will].”173 Consequently, as packaging 
becomes more and more important in swaying a potential consumer’s pur-
chasing decision, shoddy packaging may cause increasing harm to the mark 
owner’s good will, resulting in a higher likelihood of trademark infringe-
ment liability.174 
In order to avoid Lanham Act liability, when sellers purchase genuine 
goods and then repackage the goods for resale, these resellers generally 
  
 168 See, e.g., New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ’g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 307-08 (9th Cir. 
1992); Grynberg, supra note 18, at 956. 
 169 Grynberg, supra note 18, at 956. 
 170 Other defenses that are not relevant to this Article include comparative fair use, 15 U.S.C. § 
1125(c)(3)(A) (2006), descriptive fair use, id., and geographic restrictions, id. § 1115(b)(4). See general-
ly New Kids on the Block, 971 F.2d at 306-07 (defining comparative and descriptive fair use); Burger 
King of Fla., Inc. v. Hoots, 403 F.2d 904, 907 (7th Cir. 1968) (describing geographic restrictions on the 
use of a registered mark). 
 171 Justin D. Swindells, Repackaging Original Trademarked Goods: Trademark Exhaustion or 
Consumer Confusion?, 7 FED. CIR. B.J. 391, 391-92 (1997). 
 172 Id. at 393. 
 173 Id. at 402. 
 174 Id. at 401-02. Mr. Swindells argues for a repackaging exception to the first sale/exhaustion 
doctrine. See id. at 409-16. 
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must (1) disclose that they have repackaged the goods; (2) include their 
own name; (3) provide notice on the package that they are not affiliated 
with the manufacturer; and (4) must not give “undue prominence” to the 
good’s mark.175 These rules for repackaged goods illustrate the underlying 
philosophy governing all sellers and resellers—an obligation to tell the truth 
regarding the source of the goods.176  
Other resellers repair goods and then resell them with the original 
trademark on the goods or the packaging.177 A reseller who is selling a re-
paired good “has the right to resell the original product with the original 
trademark attached, as long as he tells the truth about the origin of the re-
paired goods and about his responsibility for any repairs.”178 And just as a 
reseller must state that repackaged goods have been repackaged, a reseller 
of repaired goods must state that they have been repaired.179 At some point, 
however, repairs may be so extensive that the product “cannot properly be 
considered the same any longer”180 and the mark no longer truthfully de-
scribes the goods attached to it. 
B. Trademark Nominative Fair Use 
Supposedly, “[u]se of the mark alone is not sufficiently probative of” 
an intent to deceive the public into believing that the mark owner endorsed 
or somehow supported the defendant’s products or services.181 Accordingly, 
  
 175 SCHECHTER & THOMAS, supra note 44, § 31.1.2, at 731. In the foundational nominative fair use 
case of Prestonettes, Inc. v. Coty, the Supreme Court recognized that when a “mark is used in a way that 
does not deceive the public,” there is “no such sanctity in the word as to prevent its being used to tell the 
truth.” Prestonettes, Inc. v. Coty, 264 U.S. 359, 368 (1924); see also Enesco Corp. v. Price/Costco Inc., 
146 F.3d 1083, 1086 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that providing notice that a good was repackaged is neces-
sary to prevent customer confusion). 
 176 See Prestonettes, 264 U.S. at 368.  
 177 Barnes, supra note 87, at 482-83, 486. 
 178 Id. at 486. 
 179 SCHECHTER & THOMAS, supra note 44, § 31.1.2, at 732; see also Nitro Leisure Prods., L.L.C. v. 
Acushnet Co., 341 F.3d 1356, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“The Supreme Court acknowledged that, in some 
cases, used and repaired goods can be sold under the trademark of the original manufacturer, without 
‘deceiv[ing] the public,’ so long as the accused infringer had attempted to restore ‘so far as possible’ the 
original condition of the goods and full disclosure is made about the true nature of the goods, for exam-
ple, as ‘used’ or ‘repaired.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Champion Spark Plug Co. v. Sanders, 331 
U.S. 125, 129 (1947))); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 24 cmt. d (1995) (“One may 
use another’s mark in marketing genuine goods that are used, repaired, reconditioned, or altered if 
consumers are not likely to be confused into believing that the goods are new or in their original form or 
that the alterations were performed or approved by the trademark owner.”). 
 180 SCHECHTER & THOMAS, supra note 44, § 31.1.2, at 732; see also Champion Spark Plug, 331 
U.S. at 129 (“Cases may be imagined where the reconditioning or repair would be so extensive or so 
basic that it would be a misnomer to call the article by its original name, even though the words ‘used’ 
or ‘repaired’ were added.”). 
 181 Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Lendingtree, Inc., 425 F.3d 211, 227 (3d Cir. 2005). 
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nominative fair uses are actions outside of trademark law,182 and a defend-
ant has a right to use a plaintiff’s mark to truthfully describe the plaintiff’s 
goods using the plaintiff’s mark.183 In his opinion in New Kids on the Block, 
Judge Alex Kozinski declared that courts 
may generalize a class of cases where the use of the trademark does not attempt to capitalize 
on consumer confusion or to appropriate the cachet of one product for a different one. Such 
nominative use of a mark—where the only word reasonably available to describe a particular 
thing is pressed into service—lies outside the strictures of trademark law: Because it does not 
implicate the source-identification function that is the purpose of trademark, it does not con-
stitute unfair competition; such use is fair because it does not imply sponsorship or endorse-
ment by the trademark holder.184 
Yet in spite of its 20-year history, the nominative fair use defense has 
mostly been confined to the Third, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits, and is not well 
understood in any of them.185 Indeed, in the Ninth Circuit, nominative fair 
use is not an affirmative defense; rather, it replaces likelihood of confusion 
in the plaintiff’s prima facie case.186 The Ninth Circuit declares that, in as-
serting nominative fair use, a defendant “need only show that it used the 
mark to refer to the trademarked good,”187 having the burden of proving that 
(1) the product or service in question is one not readily identifiable without 
the use of the trademark; and (2) only so much of the mark is used as is 
reasonably necessary to identify the product or service.188 “The burden then 
reverts to the plaintiff to show a likelihood of confusion,”189 that the user 
has acted in a way “that would, in conjunction with the mark, suggest spon-
sorship or endorsement by the trademark holder.” 190 As noted supra, this 
  
 182 Grynberg, supra note 18, at 957. 
 183 New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ’g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 306 (9th Cir. 1992). 
 184 Id. at 307-08. 
 185 See Century 21 Real Estate, 425 F.3d at 218. 
 186 E.g., Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. v. Tabari, 610 F.3d 1171, 1175 (9th Cir. 2010) (“The 
district court applied the eight-factor test for likelihood of confusion articulated in AMF Inc. v. Sleek-
craft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348-49 (9th Cir. 1979). . . . But we’ve held that the Sleekcraft analysis 
doesn’t apply where a defendant uses the mark to refer to the trademarked good itself.”); see also Gryn-
berg, supra note 18, at 958 (citing Pebble Beach Co. v. Tour 18 I Ltd., 155 F.3d 526, 545 (5th Cir. 
1998)) (“It is not a true defense, but an alternative method of ascertaining whether liability exists in the 
first place.”).  
 187 Toyota Motor Sales, 610 F.3d at 1183. 
 188 New Kids on the Block, 971 F.2d at 308. 
 189 Toyota Motor Sales, 610 F.3d at 1183; see also KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Im-
pression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111, 118 (2004) (stating that “Section 1115(b) [of the Lanham Act always] 
places a burden of proving likelihood of confusion . . . on the party charging infringement even when 
relying on an incontestable registration. And Congress said nothing about likelihood of confusion in 
setting out the elements of the fair use defense in § 1115(b)(4). . . . [I]t takes a long stretch to claim that 
a defense of fair use entails any burden to negate confusion.”). 
 190 New Kids on the Block, 971 F.2d at 308. 
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final prong is “a substitute for the usual likelihood-of-confusion analysis”191 
and “amounts to a requirement of good faith [on the part of the defendant], 
denying protection . . . to anyone who attempts to use a trademark to con-
fuse the public.”192 
The Fifth Circuit recommends—without requiring—that courts evalu-
ate likelihood of confusion and nominative fair use simultaneously.193 In 
contrast, in 2005, the Third Circuit designed its own two-step version of 
nominative fair use, whereby the plaintiff must prove likelihood of confu-
sion under a modified likelihood-of-confusion test, which removes factors 
that are not appropriate in the context of nominative fair use.194 This replac-
es the third part of the Ninth Circuit’s test, instead asking whether “the de-
fendant’s conduct or language reflect the true and accurate relationship be-
tween plaintiff and defendant’s products or services.”195 The burden then 
shifts to the defendant to show that its use is fair, under the court’s own 
three-part nominative fair use test.196 
The First, Second, and Sixth Circuits have either rejected or declined 
to adopt nominative fair use,197 and other courts have yet to decide on its 
adoption or rejection.198 Yet in spite of this limited acceptance, nominative 
  
 191 Grynberg, supra note 18, at 957 n.265 (citing Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Welles, 279 F.3d 796, 
801 (9th Cir. 2002)). 
 192 SCHECHTER & THOMAS, supra note 44, § 31.2, at 746. 
 193 See Pebble Beach Co. v. Tour 18 I Ltd., 155 F.3d 526, 545-46 (5th Cir. 1998); see also Bd. of 
Supervisors for La. State Univ. Agric. & Mech. Coll. v. Smack Apparel Co., 550 F.3d 465, 489 (5th Cir. 
2008) (“[A] court ordinarily should consider a nominative fair use claim in conjunction with its likeli-
hood-of-confusion analysis in order to avoid lowering the standard for confusion.” (emphasis added)).  
 194 Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Lendingtree, Inc., 425 F.3d 211, 222 (3d Cir. 2005); see also 
Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. v. Tabari, 610 F.3d 1171, 1182 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that a “finding 
of nominative fair use is a finding that the plaintiff has failed to show a likelihood of confusion as to 
sponsorship or endorsement”). Thus, the burden ultimately rests on the plaintiff to establish that the use 
of the plaintiff’s mark was not nominative fair use. Id. 
 195 Century 21 Real Estate, 425 F.3d at 222. 
 196 Id. The defendant must show 
 
(1) that the use of plaintiff’s mark is necessary to describe both the plaintiff's product or ser-
vice and the defendant’s product or service; (2) that the defendant uses only so much of the 
plaintiff’s mark as is necessary to describe plaintiff’s product; and (3) that the defendant’s 
conduct or language reflect the true and accurate relationship between plaintiff and defend-
ant’s products or services. 
 
Id.  
 197 Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 102-03 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 647 
(2010); Universal Commc’n Sys., Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413, 424 (1st Cir. 2007) (“This court has 
not previously decided whether to endorse the Ninth Circuit’s test for nominative fair uses, and we have 
no occasion to do so here. We have, however, recognized the underlying principle.”); PACCAR Inc. v. 
Telescan Techs., L.L.C., 319 F.3d 243, 256 (6th Cir. 2003), overruled on other grounds by KP Perma-
nent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111, 121-23 (2004). 
 198 The Fourth, Seventh, Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh circuits have to varying degrees declined to 
affirmatively state their position on nominative fair use. See Suntree Techs., Inc. v. EcoSense Int’l, Inc., 
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fair use is mentioned, albeit without a definition, in the Trademark Dilution 
Revision Act of 2006.199 
The nominative fair use defense has been criticized for its analytical 
defects. As noted by Professor McGeveran, “[n]ominative fair use as it now 
exists has become ungainly and often unhelpful.”200 Professor McGeveran 
argues that there are three major issues with how courts apply a nominative 
fair use analysis.201 First, the analysis typically occurs late in the litigation 
process rather than early in the process, when many defenses are adjudicat-
ed.202 The second issue arises when courts 
become entangled in a foolish preliminary inquiry of asking whether the nominative fair use 
doctrine, rather than section 33(b)(4) [descriptive fair use], applies to particular facts. The 
third and most significant problem. . . is the collapse of the requirements for nominative fair 
use into a substitute likelihood of confusion analysis in a way that actually prejudices fair us-
es and further prolongs litigation.203  
Professor McGeveran also argues that “[t]his substitution also shifts 
burdens unfairly. Nominative use was not designed as a means to determine 
ultimate liability, but as a mechanism to set aside cases that fall outside the 
bounds of trademark law.”204 He evinces the Ninth Circuit’s use of the doc-
  
802 F. Supp. 2d 1273, 1282 (M.D. Fla. 2011) (mentioning nominative fair use in passing in the Eleventh 
Circuit); Teter v. Glass Onion, Inc., 723 F. Supp. 2d 1138, 1156 (W.D. Mo. 2010) (declining to apply in 
the Eighth Circuit because defendant may have caused confusion as to source or affiliation); Gennie 
Shifter, LLC v. Lokar, Inc., No. 07-cv-01121, 2010 WL 126181, at *14 (D. Colo. Jan. 12, 2010) (apply-
ing this doctrine even though it is not the law of the Tenth Circuit); Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. S & M 
Brands, Inc., 616 F. Supp. 2d 581, 589 (E.D. Va. 2009) (recognizing that the Fourth Circuit does not 
allowing this defense); DeVry Inc. v. Univ. of Med. & Health Sci.-St. Kitts, No. 08 CV 3280, 2009 WL 
260950, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 3, 2009) (applying it even though it is not the law of the Seventh Circuit). 
 199 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3)(A) (2006). (“The following shall not be actionable as dilution by blur-
ring or dilution by tarnishment under this subsection: . . . [a]ny fair use, including nominative . . . fair 
use, or facilitation of such fair use, of a famous mark by another person other than as a designation of 
source for the person’s own goods or services . . . .”); see also Siegrun D. Kane, Trademark Hot Topics: 
Progress in Bridging the Great Divides?, in 15TH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
LAW 905, 919-20 (2009). 
 200 McGeveran, supra note 17, at 89. “Although New Kids itself engaged in common-sense analy-
sis of the situation before it, the test created there has not fared as well. Courts following in the footsteps 
of New Kids sowed confusion and seriously deformed the original proposal . . . . [I]t would be prepos-
terous if famous musicians could prevent magazines from discussing them, and a reader poll is little 
different from an unauthorized biography or parody. Any other outcome could thwart both communica-
tion and competition.” Id. at 89-90. 
 201 Id. at 90. 
 202 Id. 
 203 Id. at 90-91 (referring to Cairns v. Franklin Mint Co., 292 F.3d 1139, 1150 (9th Cir. 2002)). For 
further discussion regarding how courts’ nominative fair use analyses are muddied through these prob-
lems, see McGeveran, supra note 17, at 91-97. 
 204 McGeveran, supra note 17, at 91-92. 
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trine in a way that eviscerates nominative fair use’s usefulness.205 “Instead 
of serving as an early ‘gatekeeper’ that can screen out fair uses and reduce 
the length and cost of litigation, nominative fair use becomes just another 
fact-intensive confusion inquiry that may be brought only after extensive 
discovery.”206 
Professor Graeme B. Dinwoodie likewise concludes that “the third 
part of the [Ninth Circuit’s] test looks very much a proxy for an assessment 
of likely confusion as to association, sponsorship or endorsement.”207 Pro-
fessor Dinwoodie suggests “that it is time to treat nominative fair use as an 
autonomous and real defense, rather than simply a reformulation of the test 
for likely confusion.”208  
Similarly, in his treatise, Professor Thomas McCarthy queries how the 
third part of the test  
differs from the ultimate issue that the three part test is supposed to facilitate: is there a like-
lihood of confusion? If it is not to be simply a repetition of the ultimate issue, . . . the third 
factor should be viewed as asking whether, in addition to mere use of the mark, defendant 
has engaged in some additional conduct that affirmatively suggests sponsorship or endorse-
ment by the plaintiff.209  
These criticisms appear well-founded because some courts indeed evaluate 
the third part of the nominative fair use test using the same factors they use 
for likelihood of confusion.210 Indeed, there should be some degree of con-
fusion allowed without foreclosing that a defendant’s use is objectively 
fair.211 Professor McGeveran succinctly summarizes the confused and inad-
equate state of the nominative fair use defense: 
[C]ourts have gradually larded up the simple idea of nominative fair use presented in New 
Kids to the point where it is excessively complex and minimally useful. By moving the doc-
trine away from any role as an early screening mechanism and closer in timing and substance 
  
 205 See generally id. at 88-97 (discussing the normative fair use doctrine). 
 206 Id. at 91. McGeveran notes that “[t]he Ninth Circuit has explicitly transformed nominative fair 
use into a substitute for the traditional test to judge likelihood of confusion. This shift—from regarding 
nominative fair use as a threshold showing or a defense to approaching it as an alternate standard for the 
plaintiff’s prima facie case—vitiated most of its usefulness.” Id. 
 207 Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Lewis & Clark Law School Ninth Distinguished IP Lecture: Developing 
Defenses in Trademark Law, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 99, 111 (2009). 
 208 Id. at 112. 
 209 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 23, § 23:11. 
 210 See, e.g., Mary Kay, Inc. v. Weber, 601 F. Supp. 2d 839, 858 (N.D. Tex. 2009) (“To determine 
whether there is a likelihood that consumers are confused about touchofpinkcosmetics.com’s affiliation 
with Mary Kay, the court looks to the factors laid out in Scott Fetzer, the so-called ‘digits of confu-
sion.’” (quoting Scott Fetzer Co. v. House of Vacuums Inc., 381 F.3d 477, 484-85 (5th Cir. 2004))). 
 211 KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111, 121-23 (2004). 
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to the likelihood of confusion determination, subsequent cases have destroyed nominative 
fair use.212 
Thus, this muddled application of nominative fair use has adversely af-
fected the ability of online resellers’ such as Karen Dudnikov and Amy 
Weber to truthfully describe their goods.213 This unfairly strengthens mark 
owners’ control over distribution channels for their goods beyond the initial 
sale to the public.214 
C. That First Sale of a Genuine Good 
The nominative fair use defense usually concerns comparative adver-
tising215 or other instances where the defendant is selling their own goods 
and in some way refers to the mark owner’s goods.216 Under first 
sale/exhaustion—which could be considered a variation of nominative fair 
use—the defendant does not use the plaintiff’s mark in an effort to sell her 
own goods, but rather uses the plaintiff’s mark to refer to the plaintiff’s 
goods, albeit with the intention of selling the plaintiff’s goods.217 The first 
sale doctrine is based on the principle that trademark owners should not be 
able to control downstream sales of their goods.218 
  
 212 McGeveran, supra note 17, at 97. 
 213 See Mary Kay, 601 F. Supp.2d at 857; Steiner, supra note 49. 
 214 Cf. Mary Kay, 601 F. Supp. 2d at 857 (applying the Ninth Circuit test to Ms. Weber’s sale of 
Mary Kay products); Steiner, supra note 49 (describing Ms. Dudnikov’s losses due to legal challenges). 
 215 See 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4) (2006) (“[T]he right to use . . . [a] mark shall be subject to proof of 
infringement . . . and shall be subject to the following defenses or defects: . . . [t]hat the use of the name, 
term, or device charged to be an infringement is a use [which] . . . is descriptive of and used fairly and in 
good faith only to describe the goods or services of such party[.]”); id. § 1125(c)(3)(A)(i) (“The follow-
ing shall not be actionable as dilution by blurring or dilution by tarnishment under this subsection: . . . 
[a]ny fair use, including a nominative or descriptive fair use, or facilitation of such fair use, of a famous 
mark by another person other than as a designation of source for the person’s own goods or services, 
including use in connection with . . . advertising or promotion that permits consumers to compare goods 
or services[.]”); Lindy Pen Co. v. Bic Pen Corp., 725 F.2d 1240, 1248 (9th Cir. 1984) (“[L]iability for 
infringement may not be imposed for using a registered trademark in connection with truthful compara-
tive advertising.”). 
 216 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4). 
 217 See Sebastian Int’l, Inc. v. Longs Drug Stores Corp., 53 F.3d 1073, 1074 (9th Cir. 1995) (per 
curiam). 
 218 Id.; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 24 cmt. b (1995).  
 
The rules governing the protection of trademarks are intended to prevent the diversion of 
trade or harm to reputation that is likely to result if consumers are confused as to the source 
or sponsorship of goods and services. Confusion does not occur, however, when a trademark 
is used to identify genuine goods marketed under that mark by the trademark owner. Thus, 
the trademark owner cannot ordinarily prevent or control the sale of goods bearing the mark 
once the owner has permitted those goods to enter commerce. It can be said that the rights of 
the trademark owner are exhausted once the owner authorizes the initial sale of the product 
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While first sale is legislatively created in the Copyright Act,219 trade-
mark and patent first sale (or exhaustion) affirmative defenses are long-
recognized judicial constructs.220 All three, however, serve a similar pur-
pose: to “narrow[] the rights of the creator of intellectual property by creat-
ing competition between the creator and the reseller of the work.”221 As 
noted supra,222 the Supreme Court has recognized as early as 1924 that, 
even though it results in the secondary market merchant getting some ad-
vantage from the mark, a mark may be used by a refurbisher or reseller of a 
good in a way that does not deceive the public.223 Under the exhaustion doc-
trine,  
  
under the trademark or that the owner implicitly licenses others to further market the goods 
under the mark. Thus, no infringement occurs when the use of a mark properly identifies the 
source, sponsorship, or certification of the goods or services, even if the owner of the mark 
objects to the use. 
 
Id. For an in-depth discussion on the first sale rule and its rationale, see Barnes, supra note 87, at 461-
69. 
 219 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2006). 
 
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106(3) [the distribution right], the owner of a par-
ticular copy or phonorecord lawfully made under this title, or any person authorized by such 
owner, is entitled, without the authority of the copyright owner, to sell or otherwise dispose 
of the possession of that copy or phonorecord. 
 
Id. Patent law has a robust, but judicially created exhaustion principle. See Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG 
Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 625 (2008) (“The longstanding doctrine of patent exhaustion provides that the 
initial authorized sale of a patented item terminates all patent rights to that item.”).  
 220 See, e.g., Champion Spark Plug Co. v. Sanders, 331 U.S. 125, 129 (1947); Prestonettes, Inc. v. 
Coty, 264 U.S. 359, 360 (1924); see also Quanta Computer, 553 U.S. at 625; B. Braun Med., Inc. v. 
Abbott Labs., 124 F.3d 1419, 1426 (Fed Cir. 1997) (“[A]n unconditional sale of a patented device 
exhausts the patentee’s right to control the purchaser’s use of the device thereafter.”); RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 24 (1995) (“One is not subject to [infringement] liability . . . for 
using another's trademark, trade name, collective mark, or certification mark in marketing genuine 
goods or services the source, sponsorship, or certification of which is accurately identified by the 
mark[.]”). 
 221 Barnes, supra note 87, at 461. 
 222 See supra notes 175-180 and accompanying text. 
 223 Champion Spark Plug, 331 U.S. at 129; see Prestonettes, 264 U.S. at 360; see also Nitro Lei-
sure Products, LLC v. Acushnet Co., 341 F.3d 1356, 1360-62 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
  One significant limitation on the first sale doctrine is that it only applies to unaltered or “genu-
ine goods,” unless the consumer has reason to know of the alterations. Therefore, using the mark in 
connection with the resale of a materially different product is trademark infringement. Davidoff & Cie, 
S.A. v. PLD Int’l Corp., 263 F.3d 1297, 1302 (11th Cir. 2001). First Sale and nominative fair use de-
fenses are inapplicable for altered goods, because “[a] materially different product is not genuine and 
may generate consumer confusion about the source and the quality of the trademarked product.” Bel-
tronics USA, Inc. v. Midwest Inventory Distrib., LLC, 562 F.3d 1067, 1072 (10th Cir. 2009). In Bel-
tronics, the Tenth Circuit stated that a difference is material if a consumer would consider the difference 
relevant in the decision to purchase the product. Id. at 1073. These differences are not limited to the 
physical product; they may include warranties and “service commitments.” Id. Yet “[t]he purpose of the 
material difference test is to assist courts in determining whether allegedly infringing products are likely 
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[t]he resale of genuine trademarked goods generally does not constitute infringement. This is 
for the simple reason that consumers are not confused as to the origin of the goods: the origin 
has not changed as a result of the resale. . . . [T]he trademark protections of the Lanham Act 
are exhausted after the trademark owner’s first authorized sale of that product. Therefore, 
even though a subsequent sale is without a trademark owner’s consent, the resale of a genu-
ine good does not violate the Act.224 
It reflects a general public policy against restraints on alienation.225 
The Southern District of New York quite recently reaffirmed this 
longstanding principle in Bel Canto Design, Ltd. v. MSS HiFi, Inc.226—“as a 
general matter, trademark law does not reach the sale of genuine goods 
bearing a true mark even though the sale is not authorized by the mark 
owner.”227 The court reaffirmed that the “Lanham Act does not give mark 
owners the right to control subsequent, non-authorized resales, as long as 
the product sold is genuine.”228 In her opinion, Judge Colleen McMahon 
cites the long history in the Second Circuit recognizing that “the unauthor-
  
to cause confusion . . . and undermine the [good will] the trademark owner has developed . . . .” Id. at 
1074. Therefore, material differences by themselves may not trigger liability. In other words, because 
the critical issue remains likelihood of confusion, material differences will not cause liability for trade-
mark infringement as long as the seller dispels potential confusion by sufficiently disclosing material 
differences to the buyer. Id. The premise of first sale is that the consumers are getting exactly what they 
bargained for. S&L Vitamins, Inc. v. Austl. Gold, Inc., 521 F. Supp. 2d 188, 202 (E.D.N.Y. 2007); see 
also Matrix Essentials, Inc. v. Emporium Drug Mart, Inc., 988 F.2d 587, 591 (5th Cir. 1993).  
 224 Davidoff & Cie, 263 F.3d at 1301-02 (citations omitted); see also Beltronics USA, 562 F.3d at 
1071 (“Those who resell genuine trademarked products are generally not liable for trademark infringe-
ment.”); Austl. Gold, Inc. v. Hatfield, 436 F.3d 1228, 1240-41 (10th Cir. 2006) (“[T]he right of a pro-
ducer to control distribution of its trademarked product does not extend beyond the first sale of the 
product[,] [r]esale by the first purchaser of the original article under the producer’s trademark is neither 
trademark infringement nor unfair competition. It is the essence of the ‘first sale’ doctrine that a pur-
chaser who does no more than stock, display, and resell a producer’s product under the producer’s 
trademark violates no right conferred upon the producer by the Lanham Act.” (second and third altera-
tions in original) (quoting Sebastian Int’l, Inc. v. Longs Drug Stores Corp., 53 F.3d 1073, 1074, 1076 
(9th Cir. 1995) (per curiam))); NEC Elecs. v. CAL Circuit Abco, 810 F.2d 1506, 1509 (9th Cir. 1987) 
(“The reason is that trademark law is designed to prevent sellers from confusing or deceiving consumers 
about the origin or make of a product, which confusion ordinarily does not exist when a genuine article 
bearing a true mark is sold.”). 
 225 Barnes, supra note 87, at 458, 462 (“The first sale rule reflects property law’s distaste for re-
straints on alienation and allows the holder of intellectual property rights to obtain the price for its 
creations only once.”). 
 226 837 F. Supp. 2d 208 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
 227 Id. at 222 (quoting Zip Int’l Grp., LLC v. Trilini Imps., Inc., No. 09-CV-2437(JG)(VVP), 2011 
WL 2132980, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. May 24, 2011)). MSS HiFi, however, had altered the goods’ serial num-
ber, and the court found that these constituted “altered goods” which, as noted supra, are not genuine 
articles and “may generate consumer confusion about the source and quality of the trademarked prod-
uct.” Id. at 223 (citing Beltronics USA, 562 F.3d at 1072). 
 228 Bel Canto Design, 837 F. Supp. 2d at 222. 
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ized sale of a trademarked article does not, without more, constitute a Lan-
ham Act violation.”229 
Thus, a reseller has the right to dispose of genuine goods that were 
originally produced under the authority of the mark owner, provided that 
the goods are not materially altered and the reseller does not give the im-
pression it is affiliated with the manufacturer.230 “Resale by the first pur-
chaser of the original article under the producer’s trademark is neither 
trademark infringement nor unfair competition.”231 Because reselling the 
manufacturer’s product can lead to some confusion as to the connection 
between the mark owner and the reseller, the first sale defense should not 
be  
rendered inapplicable merely because consumers erroneously believe the reseller is affiliated 
with or authorized by the producer. It is the essence of the “first sale” doctrine that a pur-
chaser who does no more than stock, display, and resell a producer’s product under the pro-
ducer’s trademark violates no right conferred upon the producer by the Lanham Act. When a 
purchaser resells a trademarked article under the producer’s trademark, and nothing more, 
there is no actionable misrepresentation under the statute.232 
Courts should tolerate more confusion than they typically do where the 
defendant is using a mark similar to the plaintiff’s to sell the defendant’s 
own goods.233 As noted by David Barnes, courts tend to treat first sale “as 
an affirmative defense to what would otherwise be an infringement of the 
creator’s rights . . . [and] the trademark defendant has the burden of proving 
that it was reselling genuine and lawfully acquired goods.”234 However, it is 
the plaintiff’s burden under the Lanham Act to establish likelihood of con-
  
 229 Id.; see also Brain Pharma, LLC v. Scalini, No. 12-60132-CIV-COHN/SELTZER, 2012 WL 
1563917, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 30, 2012) (holding that reselling the mark owner’s products for 50 per-
cent below their retail price did not overcome the first sale doctrine, and dismissing the suit for failure to 
state a claim for allegations of trademark infringement, unfair competition, or false designation of 
origin). 
 230 See Champion Spark Plug Co. v. Sanders, 331 U.S. 125, 129 (1947) (“[W]e would not suppose 
that one could be enjoined from selling a car whose valves had been reground and whose piston rings 
had been replaced unless he removed the name Ford or Chevrolet.”); Mary Kay, Inc. v. Weber, 601 F. 
Supp. 2d 839, 848 (N.D. Tex. 2009).  
 231 Sebastian Int’l, Inc. v. Longs Drug Stores Corp., 53 F.3d 1073, 1074 (9th Cir. 1995) (per curi-
am); see also NEC Elecs. v. CAL Circuit Abco, 810 F.2d 1506, 1509 (9th Cir. 1987) (“Once a trade-
mark owner sells his product, the buyer ordinarily may resell the product under the original mark with-
out incurring any trademark law liability.”). 
 232 Sebastian Int’l, 53 F.3d at 1076; see also Standard Process, Inc. v. Total Health Disc., Inc., 559 
F. Supp. 2d 932, 937 (E.D. Wis. 2008). 
 233 See Sebastian Int’l, 53 F.3d at 1076 (applying the first sale doctrine despite consumer confu-
sion); see also NEC Elecs., 810 F.2d at 1509 (“[T]rademark law is designed to prevent sellers from 
confusing or deceiving consumers about the origin or make of a product.”). 
 234 Barnes, supra note 87, at 465. 
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fusion as part of the prima facie case.235 Therefore, if the reason for the al-
leged likelihood of confusion claim is that the goods are not genuine, the 
plaintiff must prove that.236  
D. Exhausted in Cyberspace 
The trademark first sale/exhaustion principle supposedly extends to a 
reseller’s use of a mark in cyberspace.237 This means that “[a] retailer can 
use a brand name on Web site ads selling that branded product without a 
license from the trademark owner,”238 so long as the reseller does not mis-
lead the consumer into believing that the reseller is an authorized dealer of 
the brand.239 Deceptiveness as to affiliation between the reseller and the 
  
 235 KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111, 121 (2004) (holding 
that it is the plaintiff’s burden to show a likelihood of confusion and that the defendant raising the af-
firmative defense of descriptive fair use has no independent burden to show no likelihood of confusion); 
see also Barnes, supra note 87, at 465-67. 
 
Proof of genuineness of the goods being resold is intimately linked to the question of wheth-
er there is likely to be confusion about the source of the goods. If the goods are genuine, 
there can be no confusion because the trademark appearing on the goods correctly identifies 
the manufacturer. The plaintiff in a trademark suit clearly has the burden of showing that a 
likelihood of confusing arises from the defendant’s conduct. 
 
Id. at 466-67. 
 236 Barnes, supra note 87, at 466-67. 
 237 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 23, § 25:41. 
 238 Id. (referencing Patmont Motor Werks, Inc. v. Gateway Marine, Inc., No. C 96-2703 TEH, 
1997 WL 811770, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 1997), where the district court held that the “defendant 
could sell GO-PED trademarked motorized scooters, using that mark at defendant’s Web site” because 
the “Web site in question . . . refers to the Go-Ped mark only to the extent necessary to identify the 
particular brand of scooter that he had for sale”); cf. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Church, 411 
F.2d 350, 352 (9th Cir. 1969) (holding that “[a]lthough he may advertise to the public that he repairs 
appellant’s cars, [the appellee-defendant] must not do so in a manner which is likely to suggest to his 
prospective customers that he is part of Volkswagen’s organization of franchised dealers and repair-
men”). 
 239 See Bernina of Am., Inc. v. Fashion Fabrics Int’l, Inc., No. 01 C 585, 2001 WL 128164, at *2 
(N.D. Ill. Feb. 9, 2001) (“It is well-settled that under the ‘first sale doctrine,’ an independent dealer may 
use a manufacturer’s trademark to re-sell that brand of goods, and that such conduct does not constitute 
trademark infringement or unfair competition. However, ‘one who resells trademark goods is obligated 
to do so in a manner that is not likely to cause confusion or imply that the seller is associated with the 
manufacturer.’” (citations omitted) (quoting Quill Corp. v. NADA Scientific Ltd., No. 97 C 7461, 1998 
WL 295502, at *3 (N.D. Ill. May 21, 1998))); see also Austl. Gold, Inc. v. Hatfield, 436 F.3d 1228, 
1241 (10th Cir. 2006) (“[T]he first sale doctrine does not protect resellers who use other entities’ trade-
marks to give the impression that they are favored or authorized dealers for a product when in fact they 
are not.”); 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 23, § 25:41. 
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mark owner could also be better handled through a claim of false advertis-
ing.240 After all, courts have consistently held that 
[a]fter the first sale, the brandholder's control is deemed exhausted. Down-the-line retailers 
are free to display and advertise the branded goods. Secondhand dealers may advertise the 
branded merchandise for resale in competition with the sales of the markholder (so long as 
they do not misrepresent themselves as authorized agents).241  
Exhaustion should apply equally to online sales as it does to brick-and-
mortar stores.242 Courts, however do not always do so, and—as discussed 
below—by supporting plaintiffs’ claims of trademark infringement, they 
extend control over the distribution channels of goods beyond the initial 
sale.243  
IV. CHALLENGING THE MARK OWNER’S DESIRE FOR TOTAL CONTROL 
As illustrated supra, there is a need for comprehensive and definitive 
trademark nominative fair use and first sale doctrines with regard to online 
resale of genuine goods, along with more leeway regarding initial interest 
confusion related to distribution affiliation.244 Our solutions are supported 
by recent trademark scholarship advocating the need for a showing of actu-
al injury, rather than “merely a benefit to someone else.”245 
  
 240 See generally Lemley & McKenna, supra note 16, at 444-45. Professors Mark Lemley and 
Mark McKenna propose importing into trademark law the materiality requirement courts have created in 
the false advertising context and applying it in any case based on confusion that does not relate to source 
or control over quality.  
 
Plaintiffs bringing cases then would face a choice: (1) bring a trademark infringement claim 
and be required to prove confusion regarding actual source or responsibility for the quality of 
the defendant’s goods or services; or (2) bring a false advertising-type claim alleging that the 
use causes some other form of confusion and be required to prove confusion about that rela-
tionship and that such confusion materially affects consumers’ decisions whether to purchase 
the defendant’s goods or services. 
 
Id. at 446. 
 241 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 23, § 25:41 (quoting Osawa & Co. v. B & H Photo, 589 F. Supp. 
1163, 1173-74 (S.D.N.Y. 1984)). 
 242 See, e.g., Austl. Gold, Inc., 436 F.3d at 1240-41 (regarding a website); Sebastian Int’l, Inc. v. 
Longs Drug Stores Corp., 53 F.3d 1073, 1076 (9th Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (regarding a pharmacy). 
 243 Lemley & McKenna, supra note 14, at 152-53. 
 244 See Goldman, supra note 14, at 587; Lemley & McKenna, supra note 16, at 448-49; supra Part 
I.C;  
 245 See Lemley & McKenna, supra note 14, at 188. Professors Lemley and McKenna provide a two 
part test: 
[T]rademark plaintiffs should have to demonstrate (1) that their injury flows from confusion 
about the actual source of the defendant’s goods or about who is responsible for the quality 
of those goods, or (2) that the defendant’s use causes confusion about some other relation-
ship that is material to consumer purchasing decisions. 
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A. Strengthening Available Defenses 
In line with this current advocacy seeking to eliminate claims where 
there is no confusion as to source or responsibility or material confusion,246 
this Article proposes more specific solutions with regard to Internet re-
sellers. There is a need for either the courts or Congress to rebalance the 
scales regarding trademark rights to prevent continued control by mark 
owners of the distribution of their products beyond the first sale.247 Howev-
er, “[a]bsent congressional action, courts have only a limited ability to cor-
rect the imbalance between trademark liability and defenses.”248 For a legis-
lative solution that would protect resellers of genuine goods without affect-
ing a mark owner’s ability to remove counterfeit goods from the market-
place, Congress could add language to the Lanham Act which (1) codifies 
trademark first sale and nominative fair use as defenses under Section 
33(b); (2) eliminates the controversial claim of initial interest confusion 
regarding the sale of genuine goods; and (3) specifies a requirement of de-
ceptive intent regarding distribution affiliation confusion for it to be an ac-
tionable claim.249 This would generate uniformity among the circuits regard-
ing nominative fair use, initial interest confusion, and the robustness of the 
first sale doctrine with regard to trademarks. Professor Michael Grynberg 
notes that when Congress passed the Trademark Anti-Dilution Act, it “en-
act[ed] specific safe harbors for activities that are unlikely to cause confu-
sion or those that may cause confusion, but whose social utility is high 
enough that the benefits of immunizing the acts outweigh any costs.”250 
Since the trademark exhaustion doctrine has its roots in copyright 
law,251 an amendment to the Lanham Act could mimic Section 109 of the 
  
Id. 
 246 See id. 
 247 Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 520 F.3d 644, 650 (6th Cir.) (Griffin, J., dissenting) (stating 
that courts tend to “legislate from the bench” only to implement what they believe is the intent of Con-
gress), vacated, No. 07-5040, 2008 WL 6191996 (6th Cir. July 28, 2008). 
 
Were judges empowered to revise and amend statutes to further what we believe to be the 
“purpose” of the law, there would be no limit on judicial legislation and little need for Con-
gress. Recognizing the consequences of such unbridled judicial forays into the legislative 
sphere, the Supreme Court has admonished “time and again that a legislature says in a statute 
what it means and means in a statute what it says there.” 
 
Id. (quoting Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291, 296 (2006)).  
 248 Grynberg, supra note 18, at 970. 
 249 Cf. Lemley & McKenna, supra note 16, at 450 (“[T]he law should require that trademark own-
ers claiming infringement based on confusion regarding anything other than source or responsibility for 
quality must demonstrate the materiality of that confusion to consumer purchasing decisions.”). 
 250 Grynberg, supra note 18, at 962. 
 251 See S&L Vitamins, Inc. v. Austl. Gold, Inc., 521 F. Supp. 2d 188, 202 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (“Alt-
hough the first sale doctrine traditionally applies as a defense to copyright infringement claims, courts 
have recognized it as a restraint on trademark infringement claims as well.”). 
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Copyright Act.252 Similar language would provide uniformity across these 
two often-times related intellectual property claims. As discussed earlier, 
copyright and trademark infringement are often asserted in the same law-
suit.253 If Lanham Act language clearly stated that the same first sale excep-
tion which applied for copyright also applied for the use of the mark at-
tached to the goods, this would give resellers more certainty in their use of 
the mark owner’s brand when identifying the mark owner’s goods during 
resale.
 
 
This solution should lead to less litigation; however unless damages 
for frivolous suits are allowed, it may not stop the reality of cease-and-
desist letters and threatened litigation.254 Penalties for threats of frivolous 
litigation are common, and are part of anti-trust law,255 first amendment 
protection256 and copyright law.257 Similarly worded language in the Lan-
  
 252 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2006). The Copyright Act is succinct in its first sale exception:  
 
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106(3) [the owner’s exlusive right of distribution], 
the owner of a particular copy or phonorecord lawfully made under this title . . . is entitled, 
without the authority of the copyright owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of 
that copy or phonorecord. 
 
Id. 
 253 See Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. Akanoc Solutions, Inc., 658 F.3d 936, 939-40 (9th Cir. 
2011); Zobmondo Entm’t, LLC v. Falls Media, LLC, 602 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2010); Halicki 
Films, LLC v. Sanderson Sales & Mktg., 547 F.3d 1213, 1216-17 (9th Cir. 2008); JCW Invs., Inc. v. 
Novelty, Inc., 509 F.3d 339, 341 (7th Cir. 2007); Luv N’ Care, Ltd. v. Insta-Mix, Inc., 438 F.3d 465, 
468 (5th Cir. 2006); see also Kevin L. Murch, Comment, Cybercourt: Copyright and Trademark Law 
on the Information Superhighway, 24 CAP. U. L. REV. 809, 818-19 (1995). 
 254 See supra notes 51-65 and accompanying text. 
 255 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 15(a)(1), 15a(1), 15c(a)(2)(A) (2006); see also Lemley & McKenna, supra 
note 16, at 446 (“Courts in antitrust cases have identified certain conduct, including conspiring to fix 
prices, rig bids, or divide markets, as the type of conduct experience has shown harms competition in 
most cases.”). 
 256 See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 425.16(a), (b)(1), (c)(1) (West 2012).  
 
Anti-SLAPP actions; motion to strike; discovery; remedies 
   (a) The Legislature finds and declares that there has been a disturbing increase in lawsuits 
brought primarily to chill the valid exercise of the constitutional rights of freedom of speech 
and petition for the redress of grievances . . . [and] that it is in the public interest to encour-
age continued participation in matters of public significance, and that this participation 
should not be chilled through abuse of the judicial process. . . . [Therefore:]  
   (b)(1) A cause of action against a person arising from any act of that person in furtherance 
of the person’s right of petition or free speech under the United States Constitution or the 
California Constitution in connection with a public issue shall be subject to a special motion 
to strike . . . . [and] 
* * * 
   (c)(1) . . . a prevailing defendant on a special motion to strike shall be entitled to recover 
his or her attorney’s fees and costs. 
 
Id.  
 257 See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 512(f) (2006) (“Any person who knowingly materially misrepresents 
under this section . . . that material or activity is infringing . . . shall be liable for any damages, including 
 
196 GEO. MASON L. REV. [VOL. 20:1 
ham Act may prevent some of this bullying with regard to frivolous litiga-
tion.258 
B. Expect Some Confusion 
As noted supra, courts should move back towards their “traditional 
willingness to permit a considerable degree of confusion in order to leave 
room” for competition.259 Professor Jennifer E. Rothman contends that, with 
regard to metatags, domain names, and search engines, 
[t]he initial interest confusion doctrine. . . conflicts with specific well-established principles 
in trademark law. Trademark law, like copyright and patent law, provides that a consumer 
who purchases a good can freely resell that good without committing trademark infringe-
ment. Being able to resell goods necessitates the ability to advertise the sale of such goods. 
The initial interest confusion doctrine severely limits the freedom of consumers to resell 
products.260  
More broadly, Professor Glynn Lunney argues that, “we must limit ac-
tionable confusion to cases where, if the use is allowed to continue, a sub-
stantial number of purchasers or prospective purchasers will actually be-
come confused concerning information that will materially influence their 
buying decisions.”261 As such, this Article argues that, unless the mark own-
er can show actual deception on the part of the reseller, as a general rule 
plaintiffs should not be allowed to claim initial interest confusion with re-
gard to alternative distribution channels of genuine goods.262 First, as long 
  
costs and attorneys’ fees, incurred by the alleged infringer . . . who is injured by such misrepresenta-
tion.”). 
 258 Though it would do little to prevent the sending of threatening cease-and-desist letters, this 
matter is a problem faced by copyright and patent defendants as well and not an issue that will be dis-
cussed in this Article. See Marketa Trimble, Setting Foot on Enemy Ground: Cease-and-Desist Letters, 
DMCA Notifications and Personal Jurisdiction in Declaratory Judgment Actions, 50 IDEA 777, 786-87 
(2010). 
 259 Lunney, supra note 19, at 385. Cf. Grynberg, supra note 18, at 963 (“Congress could . . . give 
judges explicit authority to devise and apply flexible defenses to trademark liability when circumstances 
warrant. In much the same way Congress amended the Copyright Act to incorporate the fair use doc-
trine, previously a common law creation, it could legislate a similarly open-ended standard for judges to 
apply in the trademark realm. Alternatively, Congress could follow the model of the FTC Act and create 
a standard that contains some guidance for courts to follow in determining whether to excuse purported-
ly infringing conduct.” (footnote omitted)).  
 260 Rothman, supra note 14, at 140 (footnote omitted). 
 261 Lunney, supra note 19, at 478; see also id. at 483 (“Similarly, confusion as to endorsement can 
be actionable, but only if the factual situation is one where endorsement is typically found and likely to 
influence consumer buying.”). 
 262 Strange Music, Inc. v. Strange Music, Inc., 326 F. Supp. 2d 481, 492 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (stating 
that “due to the ease with which the consumer could return to the search results posted by the search 
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as there is no deception on the part of the reseller, any confusion as to “dis-
tribution channel” affiliation ends prior to the sale of the good.263 Second, as 
noted earlier, many consumers visit sites like eBay and Craigslist for the 
purpose of finding genuine goods at lower costs than they would expect to 
find when buying directly from the mark owner or an authorized retailer.264 
Indeed, when a product is subject to first sale doctrine and the nomina-
tive fair use that accompanies it, some confusion should be expected. The 
Supreme Court declared in KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Im-
pressions I, Inc.265 that, “[s]ince the burden of proving likelihood of confu-
sion rests with the plaintiff, and the fair use defendant has no free-standing 
need to show confusion unlikely, it follows . . . that some possibility of con-
sumer confusion must be compatible with fair use, and so it is.”266  
Any initial confusion to the resale of a genuine good is related to the 
distribution source, not to the good itself; a claim of initial interest confu-
sion should be a spurious allegation.267 An assertion of confusion as to the 
distributor’s affiliation should be discounted—after all, there is no confu-
sion as to the source of the good; the mark owner is truthfully the source of 
the good. And to hold a defendant liable for infringement where there may 
only be initial confusion as to whether the distribution channel is associated 
with the mark owner results in the mark owner controlling subsequent sales 
of his or her product.268  
Although courts have declared that “[a]ffiliation confusion exists 
where use of a ‘unique and recognizable identifier’ could lead consumers to 
‘infer a relationship’ between the trademark owner and the new prod-
uct[,]”269 this should not apply to the distribution of the goods after the ini-
tial sale, but rather only to the good itself. Otherwise, a finding of initial 
interest affiliation confusion because the seller is not affiliated with the 
mark owner would eviscerate any protection afforded through trademark 
law’s first sale/exhaustion principle.270 
  
engine . . . so called internet initial confusion requires a showing of intentional deception on the part of 
the defendant before imposing liability”). 
 263 See, e.g., Lemley & McKenna, supra note 16, at 448 (proposing that sponsorship or affiliation 
confusion should only be actionable if “they (1) are false or misleading and (2) materially affect con-
sumer decisions”). 
 264 See Goldman, supra note 14, at 522-24 (discussing how search users can have a variety of 
reasons for the use of trademark search terms, including finding distribution sources other than those 
authorized by the mark owner). 
 265 543 U.S. 111 (2004). 
 266 Id. at 121-22. 
 267 Yet, for Amy Weber, it is not! 
 268 See Grynberg, supra note 18, at 907-08. 
 269 De Beers LV Trademark Ltd. v. DeBeers Diamond Syndicate, Inc. 440 F. Supp. 2d 249, 
274 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (quoting Star Indus., Inc. v. Bacardi & Co. Ltd., 412 F.3d 373, 384 (2d Cir. 2005)). 
 270 Rothman, supra note 14, at 140. 
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Because of the controversial nature of the claim, we should question 
whether initial interest affiliation confusion matters at all with regard to the 
secondary sale of goods. Courts have found such a claim spurious. In her 
concurrence in Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Netscape Communications 
Corp.,271 Judge Marsha Berzon contended that it was not “reasonable to find 
initial interest confusion when a consumer is never confused as to source or 
affiliation, but instead knows, or should know, from the outset that a prod-
uct or web link is not related to that of the trademark holder because the list 
produced by the search engine so informs him.”272 Yet this form of confu-
sion has been successfully asserted in Internet resale cases.273 Juries and 
judges have supported a finding of infringement based on initial interest 
affiliation confusion as to the distribution channel of the good,274 and have 
often discounted any first sale or nominative fair use defense.275 Judges and 
juries seem to hold Internet sales to a different standard than consignment 
and resale shops in the brick-and-mortar world, where a plaintiff would face 
a much higher hurdle to show customer confusion with regard to distribu-
tion affiliation.276 
There should be a presumption of non-infringement when a product’s 
brand is used in the advertising for the reselling of an item—including in 
the description of it or use of a photograph of the item in an online sale. 
This presumption would shift the burden of proof—rather than the reseller-
defendant asserting nominative fair use as an affirmative defense, the plain-
tiff would have to overcome this presumption as part of his or her prima 
facie case.277 
Without a proven deception by the reseller, confusion as to affiliation 
with regard to distribution channels should be negated by the fact that the 
goods in question are genuine goods, and there is no confusion as to the 
actual source of the goods. As Justice Antonin Scalia stated in Dastar Corp. 
v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp.,278 “[t]he words of the Lanham Act 
should not be stretched to cover matters that are typically of no conse-
quence to purchasers.”279 As long as the goods are genuine, we must even 
question whether the purchaser is initially confused regarding the reseller’s 
lack of affiliation with the mark owner.280 Indeed, when looking even more 
  
 271 354 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 272 Id. at 1034-35 (Berzon, J., concurring). 
 273 See supra notes 5-12, 124-127, and accompanying text. 
 274 See Brookfield Commc’ns, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm’t Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1062, 1065 (9th Cir. 
1999). 
 275 See Mary Kay, Inc. v. Weber, 601 F. Supp. 2d 839, 858-59 (N.D. Tex. 2009). 
 276 See Rothman, supra note 14, at 169-70. 
 277 McCann v. Newman Irrevocable Trust, 458 F.3d 281, 287 (3d Cir. 2006) (“[A] presumption in 
a civil case imposes the burden of production on the party against whom it is directed[.]”). 
 278 539 U.S. 23 (2003). 
 279 Id. at 32-33. 
 280 See Sharrock, supra note 94, at 65-66. 
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generally at sponsorship or affiliation confusion, Professors Lemley and 
McKenna provide a strong argument that the “point is not that consumers 
can never be harmed by confusion regarding non-quality-related relation-
ships. Rather, the point is that the sort of attenuated confusion at issue in 
sponsorship and affiliation cases does not necessarily or even often harm 
consumers or the market for quality products[,]”281 and the costs of protect-
ing consumers from this form of confusion is unreasonably high.282 “In de-
lineating the boundary between fair and unfair competition, we must keep 
firmly in mind that if competition is to remain an effective force for pro-
moting social welfare, we must leave room for would-be competitors to 
operate.”283 
C. Resellers as a Class of Plaintiffs 
Suppose Karen Dudnikov contacted other eBay resellers who had 
faced similar problems, and they banded together as a class of plaintiffs to 
enjoin MLB and other repeat accusers from shutting them down. As dis-
cussed supra, resellers individually may not suffer enough damage to bring 
a viable lawsuit themselves.284 Forming a class of plaintiffs, however, 
would be more economical and encourage settlement as well.285 “Class re-
lief is ‘peculiarly appropriate’ when the ‘issues involved are common to the 
class as a whole’ and when they ‘turn on questions of law applicable in the 
same manner to each member of the class.’”286 Yet class actions are a rarity 
in the world of trademark law due to significant procedural difficulties.287 
For the resellers to sue a mark owner as a class of plaintiffs, they 
would need to show, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a), that (1) 
the class of resellers who are harmed by the mark owner’s actions is so nu-
merous that joinder of all members is impracticable; (2) there are questions 
of law or fact common to the class of resellers; (3) the claims of the repre-
sentative parties are typical of the claims of the class, and (4) the repre-
  
 281 Lemley & McKenna, supra note 16, at 437-38 (emphasis omitted). 
 282 Id. at 438-42. 
 283 Lunney, supra note 19, at 486. 
 284 See Grinvald, supra note 14, at 657-58. 
 285 See, e.g., In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 100 F.R.D. 718, 721 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) (noting 
that class “certification may encourage settlement of the litigation. In a situation where there are poten-
tially tens of thousands of plaintiffs, the defendants may naturally be reluctant to settle with individual 
claimants on a piecemeal basis”). 
 286 Gen. Tel. Co. of the Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 155 (1982) (quoting Califano v. Yamasaki, 
442 U.S. 682, 701 (1979)).  
 287 See FPX, LLC v. Google, Inc., 276 F.R.D. 543, 548, 553 (E.D. Tex. 2011); Eric Goldman, 
Vulcan Golf v. Google Class Certification Denied, TECH. & MKTG. LAW BLOG (Dec. 19, 2008), 
http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2008/12/vulcan_golf_v_g.htm. 
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sentative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the 
class.288 
The first two requirements of Rule 23(a), numerosity and commonali-
ty, “form the core of the class-action concept.”289 There would seem to be 
little difficulty in meeting the numerosity requirement. The site eBay alone 
boasts over 94 million users.290 If only 1 in 10,000 users had an auction 
closed or account unjustly terminated, that calculates to over 9,000 potential 
class members. And that considers only eBay users; it does not include re-
sellers who have their own websites or use other online auction sites. Hav-
ing as few as 40 class members should raise a presumption that joinder is 
impracticable and the numerosity requirement has been met.291 In addition, 
Internet resellers are spread across the globe, which tends to make joinder 
impracticable.292 
Regarding commonality, whether the trademark owner made a good-
faith inquiry into infringement before sending a takedown notification to 
eBay is one question of law and fact common to the class.293 Commonality 
requires that the class members “have suffered the same injury.”294 Recent-
ly, an eBay user brought such a claim against Coach, Inc.295 Gina Kim was 
a former employee of Coach who tried selling a genuine Coach handbag on 
  
 288 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a). In addition, they must also satisfy one of the three requirements of Rule 
23(b): 
 
(1) prosecuting separate actions by or against individual class members would create a risk 
of:  
     (A) inconsistent or varying adjudications . . . or  
(B) adjudications . . . that, as a practical matter, would be dispositive of the interests of      
the other members not parties to the individual adjudications or would substantially im-
pair or impeded their ability to protect their interests; 
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to 
the class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate re-
specting the class as a whole; or  
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to class members predominate 
over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to 
other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy. 
 
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b). 
 289 1 ALBA CONTE & HERBERT W. NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 3:13 (4th ed. 
2002). 
 290 Who We Are, EBAY, http://www.ebayinc.com/who (last visited Sept. 9, 2012). 
 291 1 CONTE & NEWBERG, supra note 289, § 3:5; see also Mullen v. Treasure Chest Casino, LLC, 
186 F.3d 620, 624 (5th Cir. 1999). 
 292 See Mullen, 186 F.3d at 624-25. 
 293 This is known as a “notice of claimed infringement” or “NOCI” on eBay. Reporting Intellectual 
Property Infringements (VeRO), EBAY, http://pages.ebay.com/help/tp/vero-rights-owner.html (last 
visited Sept. 9, 2012). 
 294 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2551 (2011) (quoting Gen. Tel. Co. of the Sw. 
v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 157 (1982)). 
 295 First Amended Complaint at 1, 4, Kim v. Coach, Inc., No. 2:11-CV-00214 RSM (W.D. Wash. 
Mar. 2, 2011). 
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eBay.296 Coach notified eBay, claiming the handbag was counterfeit, and 
eBay closed Ms. Kim’s auction and terminated her seller account.297 Ms. 
Kim sued for a declaratory judgment, among other claims, and attempted to 
certify a class of all consumers in Washington State who had received simi-
lar treatment from Coach.298 Ms. Kim alleged that Coach had no basis in 
fact for its allegation she was selling a counterfeit handbag.299 This appears 
to be a sufficiently common question.300 Even though generally trademark 
law may be rife with factual disputes, if the legal issue can be framed 
properly in terms of the trademark owner’s lack of inquiry and the reseller’s 
defense under first sale, then the matter is ripe for adjudication as a class 
action—because the “determination of its truth or falsity will resolve an 
issue that is central to the validity of each one of the claims in one 
stroke.”301  
In 2008, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, in 
Vulcan Golf, LLC v. Google Inc.,302 found the commonality requirement 
was met based on the allegation that the defendants had allegedly engaged 
in a deceptive scheme to benefit from the plaintiffs’ trademarks.303 Thus, the 
common question can center on the defendants’ actions.304  
A class action similar to Ms. Kim’s has been proposed in the U.S. Dis-
trict Court for the District of Colorado. In Righthaven LLC v. Buzzfeed, 
Inc.,305 the defendant, Buzzfeed, was sued for copyright infringement for 
posting a copyrighted photograph to its website.306 Buzzfeed filed a coun-
terclaim alleging that Righthaven’s lawsuits were an abuse of process be-
cause Righthaven did not own the copyrights at issue.307 Buzzfeed further 
alleged in their counterclaim that Righthaven was suing in bad faith by not 
  
 296 Id. at 2. 
 297 Complaint for Damages Class Action Alleged at 3-5, Kim v. Coach, Inc., No. 2:11-CV-00214 
RSM (W.D. Wash. Feb. 8, 2011). 
 298 Id. at 5-6. 
 299 Id. at 5. Although her lawsuit continues, Gina Kim has since dropped her class allegation. See 
Order Granting Defendants’ Motion to Strike Class Allegations, Kim v. Coach, Inc., No. C11-214-RSM 
(W.D. Wash. June 6, 2011) (granting motion with Ms. Kim’s consent). 
 300 The same factual scenario throughout the class may satisfy the commonality requirement. See 
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2549-51 (2011). 
 301 Id. at 2551. 
 302 254 F.R.D. 521 (N.D. Ill. 2008).  
 303 Id. at 525 (noting that “[a] common nucleus of operative fact” meets the commonality require-
ment (quoting Rosario v. Livaditis, 963 F.2d 1013, 1018 (7th Cir. 1992)). 
 304 Id. Ultimately, the class of plaintiffs was not certified, however. Among other reasons, the court 
found that, under Rule 23(b)(3), individual issues predominated over the questions of law or fact com-
mon to class members. Id. at 525, 527, 534. 
 305 Complaint & Demand for Jury Trial, Righthaven LLC v. Buzzfeed, Inc., No. 11-cv-00811-JLK 
(D. Colo. Mar. 30, 2011). 
 306 Id. ¶¶ 27-31, 47-48. 
 307 Defendants’ Answer & Counterclaims & Class Action Counterclaim ¶ 4, Righthaven LLC v. 
Buzzfeed, Inc., No. 11-cv-00811-JLK (D. Colo. May 16, 2011). 
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investigating whether Buzzfeed’s use of the photograph at issue was pro-
tected by fair use.308 Similarly, our hypothetical class could allege the 
trademark owners are not investigating whether the resellers’ sales are pro-
tected by first sale and not infringing.309  
The likelihood of successful class actions will also depend on the legal 
claims pursued and the remedies available to the resellers.310 Defamation 
and tortious interference are among the claims that resellers have alleged.311 
The Righthaven lawsuit and proposed class is premised on the purported 
copyright owner’s failure to investigate fair use.312 Because the Copyright 
Act provides for attorney’s fees to the prevailing party,313 this bad-faith, or 
failure-to-investigate claim has much greater prospects under copyright law 
than it would under trademark law. The Lanham Act, on the other hand, is 
more grudging and convoluted in its fee-shifting; the prevailing party may 
only recover attorney’s fees “in exceptional cases.”314 As one judge ob-
served, “[a] rainbow of standards has been promulgated to define the word 
exceptional in the Lanham Act, some seemingly requiring bad faith or other 
culpability, others following a less stringent approach.”315  
At the close of 2010, Judge Richard Posner surveyed the standards 
used across the circuit courts and decided to use a bifurcated approach to 
awarding attorneys’ fees: if the losing party is the plaintiff, then “excep-
tional” means abuse of process; if the losing party is the defendant, it means 
the defendant “had no defense yet persisted in the trademark infringement 
or false advertising for which he was being sued, in order to impose costs 
on his opponent.”316 Therefore, at least in the Seventh Circuit, reseller-
defendants accused of trademark infringement would need to both prevail 
and prove that the plaintiffs engaged in abuse of process, i.e., “the use of 
  
 308 Id. ¶¶ 4-5. The district court ultimately dismissed this lawsuit in a minute order on March 20, 
2012. See Minute Order, Righthaven LLC v. Buzzfeed, Inc., No. 1:11-cv-00811-JLK (D. Colo. Mar. 20, 
2012). The court had found in a related case that Righthaven lacked standing to sue for copyright in-
fringement. Righthaven LLC v. Wolf, 813 F. Supp. 2d 1265, 1273 (D. Colo. 2011).  
 309 Gina Kim ultimately withdrew her motion to certify the class, but these Authors consider the 
question “to be continued.” See Plaintiff’s Statement of Non-Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Strike 
Class Allegations, Kim v. Coach, Inc., No. 2:11-CV-00214 RSM (W.D. Wash. May 2, 2011); Order 
Granting Defendants’ Motion to Strike Class Allegations, supra note 299. It is only a matter of time 
before another class action is proposed. 
 310 See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2551 (2011).  
 311 See, e.g., First Amended Complaint, supra note 295, at 5. 
 312 See Defendants’ Answer & Counterclaims & Class Action Counterclaim, supra note 307, ¶ 4. 
 313 17 U.S.C. § 505 (2006). 
 314 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (2006). 
 315 Yankee Candle Co. v. Bridgewater Candle Co., 140 F. Supp. 2d 111, 120 (D. Mass. 2001); see 
also 5 MCCARTHY, supra note 23, § 30:101. 
 316 Nightingale Home Healthcare, Inc. v. Anodyne Therapy, LLC, 626 F.3d 958, 960, 963-64 (7th 
Cir. 2010). But he later called the issue of defining terms a “kind of pseudo-conflict among circuits” and 
noted that “different legal definitions of the same statutory language . . . probably don’t generate differ-
ent outcomes.” Jendusa-Nicolai v. Larsen, 677 F.3d 320, 322-23 (7th Cir. 2012). 
2012] THE MARK OF A RESOLD GOOD 203 
the litigation process for an improper purpose, whether or not the claim is 
colorable.”317 Other circuits will award attorneys’ fees for bad faith or a 
“[w]illfulness short of bad faith.”318 These standards may be difficult to 
meet, yet trademark owners are acting in bad faith by accusing Internet 
resellers of infringement, not because they are infringing, but because they 
are competing for sales.319 
FINAL THOUGHTS 
Protecting the resale market increases consumer choice and spurs mark 
owners to innovate and bring new and improved products to the market.320 
If we allow mark owners to prevent the resale of their goods, consumers 
lose out on the competition that resellers provide.321 Legislatively created 
first sale and nominative fair use doctrines, along with the elimination of 
initial interest confusion as a cause of action under the Lanham Act, would 
provide resellers and auction websites guidance in navigating the minefield 
of rights and duties with regard to Internet secondary-market sales, so that 
they more closely resemble the brick-and-mortar setting.322 This would sup-
port the economic policy goals underlying intellectual property323 and spur 
  
 317 Nightingale Home Healthcare, 626 F.3d at 963. 
 318 Compare Stephen W. Boney, Inc. v. Boney Servs., Inc., 127 F.3d 821, 827 (9th Cir. 1997) 
(noting that “Section 35(a) of the Lanham Act . . . requires exceptional circumstances” such as bad faith) 
with Tamko Roofing Prods., Inc. v. Ideal Roofing Co., 282 F.3d 23, 32 (1st Cir. 2002) (explaining that 
“[w]illfulness short of bad faith or fraud will suffice” in exceptional cases). Ordinarily district courts 
have discretionary authority to award attorneys’ fees when a party has “acted in bad faith, vexatiously, 
wantonly, or for oppressive reasons.” Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 45-46 (1991). That 
authority has been held not to apply to Lanham Act claims, however. Nightingale Home Healthcare, 
626 F.3d at 964-65 (citing Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714 (1967)). In 
addition to the fee-shifting provided in the Lanham Act, sanctions are available. “Any attorney . . . who 
so multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously may be required by the court to 
satisfy personally the excess costs, expenses, and attorneys’ fees reasonably incurred because of such 
conduct.” 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (2006); accord Waymark Corp. v. Porta Sys. Corp., 334 F.3d 1358, 1365 
(Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 319 “To bring a frivolous claim in order to obtain an advantage unrelated to obtaining a favorable 
judgment is to commit an abuse of process.” Nightingale Home Healthcare, 626 F.3d at 966. 
 320 See supra note 15 and accompanying text.  
 321 See Lemley & McKenna, supra note 14, at 187. 
 322 See supra Part IV.A.  
 323 Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127-28 (1932) (“The sole interest of the United States 
and the primary object in conferring the monopoly lie in the general benefits derived by the public from 
the labors of authors. A copyright, like a patent, is ‘at once the equivalent given by the public for bene-
fits bestowed by the genius and meditations and skill of individuals, and the incentive to further efforts 
for the same important objects.’” (quoting Kendall v. Winsor, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 322, 328 (1858))). See 
generally Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1031, 
1031, 1072 (2005); Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 
TEX. L. REV. 989, 1042-44 (1997) (“The property rights theory of intellectual property is rooted in many 
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competition and innovation in the marketplace.324 These solutions would 
also benefit consumers looking for bargains and align trademark exhaustion 
in cyberspace with its application with brick-and-mortar settings.325 
Copyright326 and patent327 laws have robust first sale defenses, which 
severely limit ongoing rights of the copyright and patent owner beyond the 
first authorized sale of the material object which embodies the intellectual 
property right(s) at issue.328 However, the weakening of trademark first sale 
doctrine with regards to online sales and advertising has, to some extent, led 
to an “end run” around copyright first sale.329  
This dilution has increasingly allowed trademark, patent, and copy-
right owners to extend control over the resale of their goods, even though 
this restraint has consistently been rejected.330 In its construction and inter-
pretation of the Lanham Act, the Supreme Court has “been ‘careful to cau-
tion against misuse or over-extension’ of trademark and related protections 
into areas traditionally occupied by patent or copyright.”331 
After all, “[t]he rights of a patentee or copyright holder are part of a 
‘carefully crafted bargain,’ under which, once the patent or copyright mo-
nopoly has expired, the public may use the invention or work at will and 
without attribution.”332 And both courts and Congress are loath to extend 
through trademark that which has been lost through the expiration of a pa-
tent or copyright.333 
For the first sale/exhaustion doctrine to be meaningful in copyright 
and patent law contexts, it must be equally robust as a trademark infringe-
  
of the same economic traditions as incentive theory, but its focus is on the ability of intellectual property 
ownership to force the efficient use of inventions and creations through licensing.”). 
 324 See Lemley & McKenna, supra note 14, at 185. 
 325 See generally Sebastian Int’l, Inc. v. Longs Drug Stores Corp., 53 F.3d 1073, 1076 (9th Cir. 
1995) (per curiam) (explaining first sale doctrine as it relates to brick and mortar stores). 
 326 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2006); see also id. § 106(3). 
 327 See, e.g., Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 625 (2008) (“The longstand-
ing doctrine of patent exhaustion provides that the initial authorized sale of a patented item terminates 
all patent rights to that item.”); B. Braun Med., Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 124 F.3d 1419, 1426 (Fed. Cir. 
1997) (“[A]n ‘unconditional sale of a patented device exhausts the patentee’s right to control the pur-
chaser’s use of the device’ thereafter.” (quoting Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700, 706 
(Fed. Cir. 1992))). 
 328 See Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 33-34 (2003). 
 329 See Lemley & McKenna, supra note 14, at 189 (“[I]t is not trademark law’s role to backstop 
copyright protection to ensure that the author captures all of the value of a work. Copyright leaves 
certain uses open for a reason.”). 
 330 See supra notes 144-160 and accompanying text. 
 331 Dastar, 539 U.S. at 34 (citing TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 29 
(2001)). 
 332 Id. at 33-34 (citation omitted). 
 333 Id. at 34; see Sebastian Int’l, Inc. v. Longs Drug Stores Corp., 53 F.3d 1073, 1075 (9th Cir. 
1995) (per curiam). 
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ment defense.334 Nominative fair use must actually be accepted by the 
courts. In “brick-and-mortar” settings, there is no confusion as to affiliation 
with the mark owner with regard to distribution channels—it would be dif-
ficult to believe that a consumer would think that a consignment shop or 
antique store was affiliated with the mark owners of all the goods sold at 
such venues. The same should hold equally true in cyberspace. 
 
  
 334 See supra notes 131-135 and accompanying text. 
